Commodity price shocks and international finance by Chang, Pang-hua Kevin
COMMODITY PRICE SHOCKS AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
by
PANG-HUA KEVIN CIANG
B.A., Economics
Harvard University
(1.983)
Submitted to the Department of Economics
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
September, 1988
Q P.H. Kevin Chang
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to
distribute copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
Signature of Author
Department of Economics
September 1988
Certified by / -
Rudiger Dornbusch
Ford International Professor of Economics
Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by
Peter Temin
Professor of Economics
OF T"M0OSY
MAR 07 1989
Archives
2COMMODITY PRICE SHOCKS AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
Abstract
This thesis examines the relationship between commodity price shocks
and international finance. As movements in world commodity prices can
produce important financial consequences for a country, so can a country's
financial position influence its participation in world commodity markets.
For example, fluctuations in a commodity's price can clearly affect the
wealth or indebtedness of a producer of that commodity. Somewhat less
obviously, a countryFs financial position, such as its net indebtedness,
or even its ability to incur indebtedness, may in turn affect its
commodity production. This thesis addresses these issues in both
theoretical and empirical terms.
Then a commodity plays a prominent monetary role, as gold and silver
often have, fluctuations in the price of that commodity can produce still
greater effects, making a direct impact on a country's exchange rate and
price level. This thesis examines such an historical occurrence: the
case of China and silver in the early 1930's.
Chapter One uses a theoretical framework to investigate how
international financial markets affect production and consumption
decisions by a typical developing country, a small commodity-producing
nation facing uncertain terms-of-trade. This investigation studies
neither the extreme case of no financial markets nor the opposite extreme
case of complete equity markets, but rather the more realistic
intermediate case in which countries do not trade equities but can borrow
and lend internationally. This possibility of intertemporal substitution
results in greater specialization and higher welfare than in the case of
no financial markets, but less specialization and lower welfare than the
scenario in which risk is shared through international equity markets.
Chapter Two considers an important historical episode in which a
commodity price shock severely disrupted a small country whose monetary
system was based on that commodity. Prior to 1935, China maintained a
silver standard: its currency floated in line with the world price of
silver and was freely convertible into silver. When the world price of
silver tripled from 1932 to 1935, China experienced a currency
appreciation, price deflation, and a rapid outflow of silver. Earlier
research has attributed the exodus of silver to a widening of China's
trade deficit or to the fall in the Chinese price level. This study
proposes, then offers evidence in support of, a new interpretation: that
silver leaving China actually represented speculative capital flight
motivated by the prospect of China's abandoning the silver standard.
Chapter Three tests empirically a hypothesis that circulated in the
mid-1980's as a possible explanation of depressed commodity prices: that
developing countries' debt-servicing difficulties had lead them to
increase commodity production. Two versions of this proposition are
tested using commodity price data from 1960 to 1986: first, that the
supply curve shifted outward in response to developing countries' need to
generate increased foreign exchange; second, that because LDC's exported
ccmodities in order to reach target foreign exchange revenue
requirements, the "supply curve" for commodities in fact sloped downwards.
To understand the effect of a specific policy indebted LDC's might have
used to stimulate exports, the study also examines commodity-country pairs
to determine whether real exchange rate devaluation had a discernible
effect on supply. Empirical findings point overwhelmingly against the
importance of supply-side effects in explaining the mid-1980's commodity
price slump, suggesting that demand or inventory behavior may have been
of greater significance.
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Rudiger Dornbusch
Title: Ford International Professor of Economics
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This thesis consists of three essays investigating the relationship
between commodity price shocks and international financial markets. This
relationship is examined theoretically in the first essay then empirically
in the second and third essays. The first essay develops a model of a
small country that produces commodities under uncertain terms-of-trade,
borrowing if necessary to smooth consumption over time. The second essay
focuses specifically on the effects on China of a sudden appreciation of
silver in the early 1930's. The third essay considers the role played by
external indebtedness of commodity-producing countries in the commodity
price decline fom 1980 to 1986.
An important focus of the thesis is the interaction between
commodity price movements and international debt. The effects of
commodity price shocks on international debt are by now evident, as
recently demonstrated on a large scale by the rapid accumulation of
developing country debt in the 1970's following the oil shock. How a
country's indebtedness in turn affects its production of commodities and
its response to actual and potential commodity price changes may be less
well understood. Both questions remain of considerable importance today
given the continued volatility in commodity markets and the large overhang
of external debt in many commodity-producing nations.
In the framework of a simple theoretical model, the first essay
studies simultaneously the effect of commodity price changes on debt and
the effect of debt on commodity production. A risk-averse country
maximizing the expected utility of its lifetime consumption must make
production decisions under uncertain terms-of-trade. The country is
7allowed to borrow and lend internationally, and period-by-period must
determine both how much to borrow and how much to specialize in its risky
comparative advantage good. Terms-of-trade realizations, by affecting
income, have a direct impact on borrowing, which is by definition equal
to consumption minus income. A country's net debt in turn influences its
level of production specialization, as risk-aversion in general depends
on wealth.
The primary distinction between this representation of international
trade under uncertainty and earlier formulations lies in the depiction of
capital markets available to the country. For example, Brainard and
Cooper (1968) (as well as other papers published shortly thereafter)
analyze the problem in the complete absence of financial markets. Terms-
of-trade uncertainty therefore leads a risk-averse country to partial
diversification rather than complete specialization according to
comparative advantage. Helpman and Razin (1978) later demonstrate that
when trade in both goods and real equities, i.e. proportional output
shares, is permitted, production diversification becomes entirely
unnecessary and total specialization occurs.
The present model, however, makes a more realistic assumption about
international financial markets, allowing international trade in assets
in the form of nominal debts or liabilities, but not in the form of state-
contingent claims such as real equities. Lessard (1983) estimated that
in 1981 over 80% of external financing to developing countries took the
form of nominal debt rather than direct foreign investment or foreign
equities. Although it is incorrect to ignore completely non-debt
instruments used in international finance, it is clearly important to
8emphasize debt over other forms of financing.
Solution of the problem, which requires certain technical
simplifications for tractability, demonstrates that when only borrowing
and lending are permitted, both specialization and expected utility are
lower than under complete financial markets but higher than with no
financial markets at all. The very ability to use borrow and lend,
permitting consumption-smoothing in the face of volatile output, induces
greater specialization in the risky comparative advantage good. Full
specialization according to comparative advantage, however, does not occur
because each country must still individually assume its entire terms-of-
trade risk. This is a clear welfare loss resulting from incomplete
markets for risk-sharing.
Borrowing limits, a concern of many developing country borrowers,
are easily incorporated into the analysis and as expected, lower
specialization and expected utility. Important extensions of this
research would include endogenously determined borrowing limits and he
possibility of default.
Throughout history, commodities have played a vital role in
economies worldwide not only as traded goods but also as a form of money.
Indeed, certain commodities, typically precious metals, have held far
greater significance as a store of wealth, unit of accounting and a medium
of exchange, both domestically and internationally, than as products with
intrinsic consumption value. Unless all countries adhere to the same
metal standard, the price of the metal in countries not using the metal
standard may vary. These global fluctuations in the price of the metal,
rather than causing a shift in production, are likely to have far-reaching
9macroeconomic consequences, affecting prices, exchange rates, and possibly
aggregate output in the countries maintaining the metal standard.
The second essay of this thesis examines the effect of a precipitous
increase in the world price of silver on China in the early 1930's. At
the time, China was the only country in the world adhering to a silver
standard. The sudden rise in the price of silver, induced primarily by
extraordinary purchases by the U.S. Treasury, caused an appreciation of
the Chinese currency and widespread deflation throughout China. At the
same time, record amounts of silver left China for sale overseas, causing
China to abandon the silver standard within less than two years, in
November 1935.
Until recently, the standard interpretation of China's departure
from the silver standard was that of Friedman and Schwartz (1963). Their
analysis focuses almost exclusively on the worsening of China's trade
deficit, which they attribute to the real exchange rate appreciation. The
outflow of silver from China, according to Friedman and Schwartz, was
simply the capital account counterpart of the trade deficit, i.e. the
funds that financed China's excess imports. Since silver constituted the
basis of China's monetary system, the loss of silver reduced China's
monetary base, thereby lowering Chinese output and prices.
Recent work by Brandt and Sargent (1988) challenges the traditional
interpretation, arguing that the silver outflows from China represented
China's expenditure of a windfall gain permitted by the real appreciation
of silver. According to Brandt and Sargent, Chinese prices were
effectively determined by international commodity arbitrage, implying that
the appreciation of the Chinese currency was offset by a corresponding
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decline in the Chinese price level. Therefore, while no real appreciation
occurred, a smaller quantity of silver could support an unchanged level
of real balances. With no contraction in the real money supply or output,
China could thus export silver temporarily in exchange for additional
resources to consume or invest.
This essay proposes a third interpretation of the drain of silver
from China, explaining these flows as speculative capital flight in
reaction to early warnings that the Chinese government might abandon the
silver standard. The currency appreciation and price deflation caused by
the rise in silver generated considerable alarm in China. The central
government reacted first by pleading with the United States, then by
imposing a series of increasingly strict capital controls that failed in
practice but signaled to speculators that China might soon suspend
convertibility of paper into silver or impose an embargo on silver.
Statistics on China's trade flows, balance-of-payments, and price
movements indicate that by far the greatest outflow of silver occurred in
1934 and 1935, years in which the trade deficit had begun to narrow and
the deflation had slowed considerably. In other words, the timing of
China's silver exports is inconsistent with the explanation of either
Friedman and Schwartz or Brandt and Sargent. The surge in silver exports
began in early 1934, as the United States renewed its commitment to
greater silver purchases and China reiterated its fears of an uncontrolled
rise in silver. This suggests that the third interpretation better
explains the facts than either of the previous two.
The essay first presents a historical overview of the facts
surrounding China and the silver standard in the early 1930's, then
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evaluates the three alternative interpretations of the silver outflow from
China. Two appendices provide background information on the Chinese
financial system and American silver policy.
While the second essay studies he effect of a commodity price shock
on international capital flows, the third essay examines a phenomenon in
which the direction of causality may be reversed. Specifically, the third
essay investigates whether the debt-servicing difficulties of developing
countries in the mid-1980's led them to increase production of
commodities, thereby depressing world commodity prices.
The prolonged decline in dollar commodity prices from 1980 into late
1986, despite a recovery in world industrial production since 1984 and a
decline in the dollar since 1985, had given rise to various explanations
emphasizing the supply side. Some suggested that the supply curve had
shifted outward as a result of developing countries' need to generate
increased foreign exchange earnings. Others observed that even as
commodity prices fell, indebted developing countries produced an unchanged
or even greater quantity of commodities, implying that the "supply curve"
might have become "downward-sloping" as debtors attempted to attain target
levels of export earnings.
A World Bank study in which debt entered with a significantly
negative coefficient in a commodity price determination equation provided
some empirical support of these propositions. Furthermore, an
unacceptably high empirical estimate of the elasticity of dollar commodity
prices with respect to the real dollar exchange rate could be explained
if it was found that the "supply curve" indeed exhibited a negative slope.
The two distinct hypotheses---that the supply curve had shifted
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utward and that the "supply curve" sloped downward---were tested on
commodity price data from 1960 to 1986. Price indices for non-oil
commodities overall and the subgroups of food, beverages, agricultural raw
materials, and metals were expressed as a function of a time trend,
industrial production in the industrial countries, the real dollar
exchange rate, and various specifications of developing countries' debt-
service requirements. Consistent insignificance of coefficients on debt-
service measures suggested the absence of any systematic outward shift in
supply. A downward sloping "supply curve" would imply increased price
sensitivity to demand shifts such as changes in world industrial
production or the real dollar exchange rate. Chow tests comparing the
1960's and 1970's against the 1980's, however, indicated no significant
increase in price sensitivity in the latter period, the years in which
debt-servicing needs might indeed have induced a downward slope in
"supply."
To determine whether exchange rate policies implemented by certain
highly indebted developing countries did in fact elicit an increase in the
export of commodities, this study also considered specific commodity-
country pairs, such as Chile and copper. Instrumental variable
regressions in which the supply of the commodity was expressed as a
function of the real local currency price suggested that real devaluations
in developing countries could not explain commodity supply behavior.
Although developing countries' indebtedness could in theory have
lead them to increase their production of commodities, empirical evidence
suggests that this did not in fact occur in the mid-1980's. The decline
in commodity prices that could not be attributed to stagnation in
13
industrial production or the appreciation of the dollar may have been the
result of microeconomic changes affecting demand or unusual inventory
management. The recovery of commodity prices since 1986 despite the
ongoing problems in developing country debt-servicing provides some
confirming evidence that supply-side behavior by these countries was
indeed of relatively low empirical importance in the mid-1980's.
Overall, these essays affirm the strong links between commodity
price shocks and international financial markets. Theoretically, it was
demonstrated that not only may commodity price movements affect
international debt, but a country's indebtedness may influence its
production of commodities, through wealth-induced changes in its aversion
to terms-of-trade risk. Empirically, the important macroeconomic
consequences resulting from a price shock to a commodity on which one's
monetary system is based were examined in detail for China in the 1930's.
Although the influence of international indebtedness on commodity price
behavior was empirically not significant in the mid-1980's, concern for
the potential feedback of a country's international financial position on
its commodity production nonetheless acknowledges the important
relationship between commodity price movements and international finance.
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CHAPTER ONE
OPTIMAL PRODUCTION DIVERSIFICATION UNDER UNCERTAIN TERMS-OF-TRADE
WITH INTERNATIONAL BORROWING AND LENDING
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OPTIMAL PRODUCTION DIVERSIFICATION UNDER UNCERTAIN TERMS-OF-TRADE
WITH INTERNATIONAL BORROWING AND LENDING
Despite the strong real-world connection between terms-of-trade
shocks and developing country borrowing, there has been little
theoretical work linking the two subjects. Production diversification,
especially reduced specialization in a single export, is in some seinse
central to both issues. Diversification will reduce a country's
vulnerability to terms-of-trade shocks and thus help it manage its debt
more effectively, resulting in smaller fluctuations in consumption, or
less frequent balance-of-payments crises. At the same time, the very
ability to accumulate debt (or in favorable periods, assets) should
enable a country to diversify less---to sacrifice less of its
comparative advantage---since intertemporal reallocation can act to
cushion terms-of-trade shocks. This paper attempts to bridge the
theoretical gap between single-period models of production under
uncertainty and intertemporal consumption-savings models, focusing on
the role of production diversification and its relevance to both these
areas.
Diversification can be defined as the reduction in the dependence
on any single product, especially primary commodities, in a nation's
total output. Early interest in the subject initially centered on the
supposed "secular decline" of commodity prices relative to
manufactures,1 but theoretical work on trade under uncertainty
1 Arguments are found in the work of Prebisch (1950) and Singer
(1950).
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demonstrated that uncertainty alone could motivate diversification,
independent of long-term trends. In one of the first papers on the
subject, Brainard and Cooper (1968) proposed a portfolio approach to
exports for a risk-averse country needing to make trade commitments
before terms-of-trade are known. Subsequent work, generally in the
framework of one-period production models,2 also demonstrated that
uncertainty in the terms-of-trade will induce a country to produce less
of its normal export, more of its normal import, i.e. to sacrifice some
of its comparative advantage in favor of direct production of its
"consumption basket."
If trade in both goods and assets is allowed, however, optimal
asset choice makes production diversification unnecessary, as shown in
the work of Helpman and Razin (1978). In particular, if equity shares
can be traded internationally, then countries simply maximize the stock
market value of their equity shares, and hedge terms-of-trade
uncertainty through diversification of their asset portfolio;
diversification in production becomes unnecessary.
The experience of developing countries in the 1970's and 1980's,
however, makes evident the need for a new approach to output
diversification in which the primary asset traded internationally is not
equity, but debt denominated in a non-commodity numeraire, typically
dollars. Despite the decline in world interest rates since 1984, the
debt-servicing problems of many developing countries continue, in many
cases exacerbated by low and unpredictable commodity prices. Indeed,
2 See, for example, Ruffin (1974), Kemp and Liviatan (1973),
Anderson and Riley (1976).
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the economic declaration of the 1987 Summit Meeting in Venice stated:
"We recognize the problems of developing countries whose economies are
solely or predominantly dependent on exports of primary commodities, the
prices of which are persistently depressed. ... Further diversification
of these economies should be encouraged, with the help of the
international financial institutions... "3 The 1987 World Economic
Outlook of the IMF asserts: "a leading policy issue for developing
countries is their foreign trade strategy. The issue is of special
importance for countries with unduly large external debts and heavy
reliance on exports of primary products."
This paper extends the portfolio approach to diversification in
production, first developed by Brainard and Cooper (1968), to an
intertemporal context in which countries can borrow and lend over time.
We know from standard gains-from-trade arguments that, provided that
there are no feedback effects on commodity prices, opening trade in
assets (in this case, bonds denominated in the consumption good) can
only improve welfare, since the country is not forced to trade in these
assets. Here, we construct the general diversification problem and
proceed to solve explicitly a simple two-period example. We demonstrate
precisely how the ability to borrow and lend unambiguously raises
national welfare by allowing a country to take greater risks in
production, i.e. to increase its specialization in commodities with
higher expected return. An immediate policy implication is that
decreased access to international credit markets may cause developing
3 New York Times, 11 June 1987, p. A16.
18
countries to reduce specialization and lower expected utility for all
potential borrowers.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces the
model in terms of its key assumptions and mathematical representation.
Section III solves a simple example of the model explicitly, and
examines the effect of a borrowing limit.
II. The Model
A. Key Assumptions
We first present the model's key assumptions and their
implications.
(1) Representative Agent. We model a developing country as a
representative agent that maximizes the present discounted utility of
its lifetime consumption. This is equivalent to assuming that the
country is run by a central planner, that all agents in the country are
identical, or that there is a complete domestic stock market.4
(2) Single Consumption Good. The assumption of a single
consumption good is intended to reflect the fact that a country's
consumption is typically much more varied than its production. We
assume that the country consumes the same market basket over time, using
4 Note that the related issue of whether free trade is optimal is
not directly addressed in this model, in which the country is depicted
as a representative agent unable to influence world prices. Under the
small country assumption, traditional optimal tariff arguments are
clearly not applicable. Moreover, if the country can be represented as
a single agent, there can obviously be no externalities domestically.
This approach differs from that of Newbery and Stiglitz (1984) or Eaton
and Grossman (1985) where incomplete markets for risk-sharing among
differing domestic agents imply that free trade can be welfare-reducing
or Pareto-inferior to protected trade
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its various exports as a means of obtaining the dollars necessary to
purchase that basket of goods. Since the price of the consumption good,
as numeraire, is precisely one dollar, we can think of the country as
directly "consuming" dollars. This simplification can be justified by
the fact that in most developing countries, domestic consumption of the
country's own major export commodities is a trivial fraction of total
production. Thus, income effects of terms-of-trade shocks will normally
overwhelm substitution effects. In this paper, we concentrate
exclusively on the income effects.
(3) Ricardian Technologies. Production technologies in this
economy are Ricardian, in line with the earlier models (e.g. Kemp and
Liviatan (1973)), and exhibit constant returns to scale. The country
is endowed in every period with a constant labor supply, normalized to
one, which it allocates across different sectors. The country can
produce the consumption good directly (the safe return) or produce a
"cash crop," the entire output of which is exported in exchange for the
consumption good. Each sector's output, expressed in terms of the
consumption good, is stochastic. For a given country, comparative
advantage in a particular sector is represented by a high expected
payoff (again in terms of the consumption good) per unit labor relative
to other sectors.5 In a world of certainty, the country clearly should
allocate all its labor to the sector with the highest return. We assume
5 In general equilibrium, "comparative advantage" would be
measured relative to another country. We assume that such advantages
are reflected in the mean "dollar" prices countries obtain in different
export markets for a unit's labor. Again, dollars are used to buy a
wide assortment of imports. Here, the country is concerned with how to
obtain those dollars.
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that each period, the country can re-allocate its labor freely.
(4) Incomplete Markets. We assume that the only asset traded
internationally is a safe bond denominated in the consumption good, or
borrowing and lending on fixed "dollar" terms. In particular, equity
markets such as those described by Helpman and Razin (1978) are not
available. Nor are commodity-linked bonds, futures, or option markets.
This assumption, albeit a simplification of reality, reflects the
overall paucity of such risk-sharing markets relative to commercial bank
debt or bonds denominated in money (the consumption good) terms.
Developing countries themselves, for political reasons, often restrict
foreign equity participation in their enterprises. Futures and options
markets are extremely thin or non-existent for maturities beyond one
year. Commodity-linked bonds, an excellent instrument for intertemporal
substitution with no terms-of-trade risk, have apparently failed to gain
widespread acceptance.6
B. Mathematical Representation
We model the country described above as one that consumes only one
good, which is the numeraire, and maximizes the present value of its
utility over time. Its utility function is additively separable in time
and its constant discount factor is . We can write this as:
T
(1) Max Z t U(ct).
ait , c t-0
6 See Lessard and Williamson (1985) pp. 86-87 for further
discussion of commodity-linked bonds and the incompleteness of this
market.
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The country can borrow and lend freely in international capital markets
at the constant iskless interest rate r. Thus, its net wealth at the
beginning of period t, wt, evolves as:
(2) w t - (Yt-1 + wt-1 - ct-1)( + r) for t - 1 to T.
No default on borrowing requires that
(2a) CT - YT + WT.
If we also impose an exogenous borrowing limit L, then we have the
further restriction:
(2b) wt s -L for all t.
The country is endowed in every period with one unit of labor, which it
allocates across sectors to generate income. Labor income, t, in any
period is:
N
(3) yt - ( it) (it)
i-O
N
where the labor shares it satisfy ai - 1 for all t, and
i-l
0 < ait < 1 for all i and all t.
zit denotes the country-specific stochastic return on sector i in period
t per unit labor input.
In any period, the labor shares (it's) are chosen before the
realizations of the returns (it's) are known. Consumption (ct), and
therefore savings or borrowing, is chosen after the it's are known.
The country in effect makes a series of alternating decisions,
allocating labor given existing net wealth, then choosing consumption
based on inherited net wealth and this period's labor income. The labor
allocation problem is exactly analogous to the standard portfolio
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problem without short sales, since labor shares must be non-negative.7
The objective function in any period, however, will vary---depending not
only on the underlying utility function but also on current wealth, and
the number of periods remaining. The consumption-savings choice also
differs from the standard problem (as found in Samuelson (1969), for
example): since labor (rather than wealth) is being allocated across
alternative "investments," wealth obtained by foregoing present
consumption is not itself allocated into those "investments," although
holdings of wealth may affect labor allocation.
The first steps in the solution of the country's optimization
problem for a general utility function and an arbitrary process for the
random returns can be found in Appendix 1. In general, however,
restrictions on the utility function and the stochastic processes will
be needed to solve the model explicitly.
III. Example of Logarithmic Utility. Binary Outcome for Risky Good. To
Periods
A. Unrestricted Borrowing, Lending, and Factor Allocation
We now apply this approach to production diversification in a
simple example that clearly illustrates the benefits of international
borrowing and lending, and their effect on output decisions. In this
optimizing framework combining comparative advantage, terms-of-trade
risk, and access to international capital markets, we demonstrate how
7 See Markowitz (1959), pp. 170-185, for an explicit solution to
this portfolio problem.
23
intertemporal substitution can take the place of production
diversification. We also determine explicitly the effects of a
borrowing limit on production and consumption decisions.
In this example, we consider a country with logarithmic (a special
form of CRRA) utility allocating its labor between one safe and one
risky good.8 The country's lifetime will consist of only two periods,
and the subjective discount rate and the world interest rate are assumed
to be zero. There are exactly two states of nature: each period, the
random return takes the value z+a with probability one half and the
value z-a with probability one half. Shocks are serially independent.
The safe return is defined as R. By assumption:
0 < z - a < R<z <z +a
The symbol d will be used to denote z - R; by the above assumption, d
< a.
In this two-period model, the country must make three consecutive
choices: al, cl, and 2. (Consumption in the second period is not
chosen but is determined by the intertemporal budget constraint: c2
- w2 + Y2. Thus, default never occurs.) We solve for the optimal
choice of these three terms in reverse order, as in any dynamic
programming problem.
(i) Solution of a=. In the second period, the country allocates
labor given w2 to maximize EU(c2), or EU[w2 + a2(Z2 - R) + R].
8 Production of the safe good is analogous to complete
diversification, i.e. direct production of the consumption basket. The
only important feature lost in our assumption of a single risky product
is the diversification opportunity made possible by the covariance of
returns across risky projects. In the general, multi-commodity case,
covariance enters critically in the solution.
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Substituting z+a and z-a fo: , we find the first-order condition with
respect to a2, yielding a2* - (R + w2 )(z - R)/[a2-(z-R)2].
(ii) Solution of cl_. Next, we explicitly derive the value
function J2(w2), which denotes the expected utility of consumption when
entering the second period with wealth w2, assuming an optimal choice
of 2. Substituting the values of , we obtain: J2(w2) - 0.5 log [w2
+ 2 *(z + a - R) + R] +0.5 log [w2 + a2*(z - a - R) + R]. Note that the
derivative of this expression with respect to w2 is l/(w2 + R).
In the first period, after Y1 is known, the country must choose
consumption cl to maximize its expected lifetime utility, namely u(cl)
+ J 2(wl + yl - cl). Maximization with respect to cl produces cl* - (w1
+ Y + R)/2. Thus the country will enter the second period with wealth
w2- (w + Y - R)/2
(iii) Solution of al*. To find the optimal a1, the country solves:
Max EU[O0.5(w + Y + R)]) + EJ2[ 0.5(w1 + Y - R)]
aC1
where Y - al(21 - R) + R
For logarithmic utility, we obtain:
al* - [(2R + w)(z - R)]/[a2 - (z - R)2]
Note that for a given w, al*(w) > a 2*(w). A longer horizon enable a
country to take greater risks.
We can now calculate explicitly the gain in expected utility
resulting from the ability to borrow and lend. Beginning with zero
wealth, .e. w - 0, the optimal program (al*, cl*, and 2*) generates
expected utility of: 2 ln R + 3 n a - (3/2) ln ( a + d) - (3/2) ln
(a - d). If the country were forced to balance its current account
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period-by-period, each period it would allocate labor as a2* (with w2 -
0) and have expected utility of: 2 [n R + In a - (1/2) n (a - d) -
(1/2) In (a + d)]. Thus, the expected utility gained from the ability
to borrow and lend is: In [a / (a2 - d2)0.5] , which will always be
positive since the numerator of the argument is greater than the
denominator. The stronger the comparative advantage and the riskier the
export, the greater the gain in utility. Of course, utility would be
still higher under complete markets, in which the country could receive
with certainty the mean of its income (z), allowing complete
specialization according to comparative advantage.
To summarize the conclusions of the logarithmic utility, binary
outcome, two-period example:
(1) The ability to borrow and lend increases expected
utility in two ways: by permitting intertemporal substitution given
income, and by inducing greater specialization according to comparative
advantage.
(2) In any period, the share of labor allocated to the risky
project increases with wealth, decreases with the variance of the risky
return, and increases with the differential between the mean of the
risky return and the safe return.
(3) For given wealth, the share of labor allocated to the
risky project increases with the number of periods remaining.9
9 A further extension backwards to period zero shows that at the
end of the zeroth (third-to-last) period, when the country has inherited
wealth w and labor income y, the country's optimal consumption co* is
(1/3)[2R + w + y]. At the beginning of period zero, when the country
has inherited net wealth w and must allocate labor, i.e. choose a0, it
will choose: a* - [(3R + w0)(z - R)]/[a2 - (z - a)2]. In othar words,
for longer horizons, an increasing proportion of labor is dedicated to
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(4) Consumption, given wealth, depends only on the safe
return, not on the expectation or variance of the risky return. An
increase in the variance of the risky return causes a re-allocation of
labor away from the risky good that leaves constant the expected utility
of consumption.l0
Since it may be extremely costly to shift labor across production
sectors, the identical problem with no re-allocation of labor is
examined in Appendix 2. The technique used is the same, but we must add
the constraint al - a2.
B. Borrowing Limits
Because a borrowing country may be unable or unwilling to repay
loans greater than a certain sum, lenders often impose credit ceilings,
beyond which a cc.untry is not permitted to borrow further.ll Such
borrowing limits, which we assume to be exogenous, are easily
the risky project, subject to the constraint 0 < a < 1. For longer
horizons, consumption appears to be approaching R, implying that present
wealth matters less since it will be spread out over more periods.
10 We can contrast this finding with the results of standard
"income fluctuations" models such as Leland (1968), Sibley (1975), and
Miller (1974). For isoelastic utility functions, they showed that
savings rise and consumption declines when the variance of income rises.
Of course, these models differ importantly from the export
diversification example; in the former, the individual cannot substitute
away from the risky cash flow.
11 See Eaton and Gersowitz (1981) for the derivation of borrowing
limits from the penalties lenders can impose on debtors who default.
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incorporated into our two-period example.12 It will be shown that a
"potentially binding" borrowing limit will induce a country to
specialize less.
A borrowing limit L will not be considered even "potentially
binding" if the country's unconstrained production-consumption plan
would never entail borrowing an amount greater than L. In our example,
with w - 0, the country if unconstrained will wish to borrow (R-yl)/2
during the first period. Borrowing will be positive only if the risky
sector receives a negative shock in the first period. Since we know
that a* (for wl-0) will be 2Rd/(a2-d2), borrowing when the first-period
shock is negative must equal (R-[al*(d-a)+R])/2 - Rd/(a+d). Thus if L
> Rd/(a+d), then the country can ignore the borrowing constraint since
it will never be binding.
For any L < Rd/(a+d), however, the country will be liquidity
constrained, i.e. unable to borrow all it would like, if it chooses al*
and a negative shock occurs in the first period. Of course, the country
can avoid this risk altogether by selecting an a, sufficiently low that
it will not be liquidity constrained when the first-period shock is
negative.
As a function of L, this a equals 2L/(a-d), which we can denote
alLc, the choice of al above which the countr may be liquidity
12 We also calculate the effect of a borrowing limit expressed as
a fixed fraction of first-period income, i.e. yl. This corresponds to
a maximum ratio of debt payments to exports, or "debt-service ratio."
For > d/(a-d), the borrowing limit will never be binding. For lower
8, the limit will be important if a is greater than 2R/[(26+l)(a-d)].
The explicit solution for al* (), is: (R[4B2(d-3a)2+48(d-3a)(d+a)+
9(a+d) 2](1/2) +2RB(a+5d)-3R(a+d) )/[88(a2 -d2)]. At 8-0, this expression
reduces, using l'Hopital's rule, to 4Rd/3(a2-d2), as expected.
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constrained. Note that for L < Rd/(a+d), alLc is strictly less than al*
If the country chooses Ca such that alLc < a 1 < al* then its
expected utility will be:
0.5(log[(R+al(d+a)+R)/2] + J2[al(d+a)/2])
+ 0.5(log[al(d-a)+R+L] + J(-L)),
since if it is liquidity constrained, the country will always consume
all available resources ( plus L) in period one, then enter the second
period with wealth -L.
Maximizing expected utility with respect to al, we obtain :
al** - [4Rd + 2L(a+d)]/[3(a2 - d2 ) ].
We define a,** as the optimal choice of a when the country faces the
borrowing limit L < Rd/(a+d). It is easy to verify that when L -
Rd/(a+d), then alLC a** - a1 . For lower values of L, however, we have
the relation alLc < .
If L < Rd/(a+d), a1* is the optimal choice of al in the range above
alLc. Since expected two-period utility is everywhere a continuous
function of a (in particular at a1Lc) and d2EU/dal2 is always negative
in both the constrained and unconstrained regions, we can assert that
a** is the optimal choice of a, in the entire range of O<a1<1, for any
L<Rd/(a+d).
As we would expect, al** is a decreasing function of L. A lower
borrowing limit induces the country to specialize less, and lowers
expected utility. Note that even if L0o, i.e. no borrowing at all is
permitted, l** - 4Rd/[3(a2-d2)], which is higher than Rd/(a2-d2), the
value of a chosen when neither borrowing nor lending is allowed and the
country must balance its current account period by period.
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APPENDIX 1;: Country's Optimization Problem with General Utility Function
and Arbitrary Stochastic Process
Like any dynamic programming problem, this problem is approached
backwards, beginning with the last decision, the single labor-
allocation decision facing a country entering its last period of
consumption with wealth WT. The country chooses aT, its share of labor
dedicated to the single risky activity, to maximize its expected
utility. Or:
(i) Max EU[WT + CaTT + (1 - aT)R] - EU[wT + aT(2T - R) + Ri
aT
The first-order condition for a maximum is simply:
(4) E[U' (wT+CT(2T-R)+R)(T-R) ] - 0.
The sufficient condition for a maximum will hold almost surely provided
that the utility function is concave, i.e. that u'' < 0.
We can now ask how the optimal choice of aT, as determined in (4),
is affected by the initial wealth WT. The answer will obviously depend
on the country's utility function, but it will be interesting to examine
the effect for different functional forms of u. We perform this
exercise in comparative statics by totally differentiating the first-
order condition (4), obtaining:
E[u''(CT) (T-R) 2 1 daT + E[u''(CT) (T-R)] dwT - 0, or
deT - E[u' '(cT) (ZT-R)]
dwT E[u' '(c) (T-R) 2]
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CT WT + arT(z-R) + R
Considering specific utility functions, if u(c) is of constant
absolute risk aversion (CARA), such as u(c)- -e-e c, then u''--Ou', and
drT/dwT - 0 by the first-order condition (4). If u(c) is of constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA), such as u(c) - c'/r, then u''(c)- (-
1)c,-2, and without further restrictions on the stochastic structure of
zT, dT/dWT is of ambiguous sign.
(ii) We now incorporate the consumption decision occurring in the
next-to-last period. Suppose we define Jt(w) as the expected utility
of consumption in the remaining T-t+l periods beginning in period t,
which the country enters with wealth wt. We assume optimal labor
allocation (choice of a) in each of the T-t+l periods, and optimal
consumption in the T-t periods before the last. (In the Tth period,
which is the last period, there is no choice in consumption: c T - wT +
YT- )
Using this definition of J(w), we can express the consumption
decision of a country inheriting net wealth WT-i in the second-to-last
period as:
(5) Max U(CT-1) + JT[(WT-1 - CTl1)(1 + r)],
CT- 1
where CTi1 denotes consumption in the second-to-last period. Since we
cannot express J in terms of a general functional form, we re-write (5)
as:
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Max U(CT-1) + 8EU[(WT- 1 - CT-.1)(1 + r) + T(iT - R) + R]
CT-1, (1 T
First-order conditions ae:
(6) 0 - U'(CTl) - (l+r)EU'[(WT-1 - CT_1)(1 + r) + aT(ZT-R) +
R]
(7) 0 - E(u'[(wT-l-cTl)(l+r) + aT(iT - R) + R].[(T - R])
Since (7) uniquely defines a T for a given cTl1 , this value of a T can
be substituted into (6) allowing an explicit solution for cT1.
Taking total differentials of (6) and (7) and eliminating
daT/dwTl to solve for dcT-l/dwTl, we obtain:
(E[u''(CT)(ZT-R)2]Eu''( ( T) - E2[U' '(C T)( T- R) ])-(( I+ R ) 2dCT- 1l
dWenotes
CT denotes
here was:
daT
dwT-1
E;u''(cT)(z2-R) 2 ][u ''(cr,) + (l+r) 2Eu''(cT)]
- (l+r)2 E2 [u' (CT) (T-R) ]
consumption in the last period. The substitution used
dCT- 1l
dw-1
u" (cT_1)+8(l+r)2 Eu' (CT) (l+r)Eu' ' (cT)
E[u' (CT) (T-R) B(l+r)E[u' (cT) (T-R) ]
Examination of individual terms indicates that this expression will
always be positive, but it cannot be reduced further for the general
case. If u(c) is CARA, then E[u''(cT)(2 T-R) - O, so
Eu''(cT)9(l+r)2dCT-1
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u''(cT l) + (l+r)2Eu''(cT)
By the first-order condition shown in (6),
u'(CTl) - (l+r)Eu'(cT), so
u''(CT-1) - (14r)Eu''(cT),
since for CARA utility functions, u''(c) - -u'(c). Thus,
dCT- 1
dwT.l
Eu''(CT) (l+r)2
B(l+r)Eu''(cT)+R(l+r)2Eu''(CT)
1+ r
2+ r
but the precise amount (as opposed to the change in the amount) to be
consumed in the second-to-last period, as a function of WTl, cannot be
explicitly determined, and must be found through solving (6) and (7).
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APPENDIX 2: No Re-allocation of Labor
If the factors of production are highly specialized, then it may
be inappropriate to assume that a country can costlessly re-allocate
factors across industries over time. In the two-period, two-industry,
logarithmic example with two states of nature, we incorporate an extreme
form of industry-specificity in labor: complete lack of
substitutability, or infinite costs of re-allocating.
We solve the same problem subject to the constraint al - a2 . The
country makes two (rather than three) decisions: first, its permanent
choice of a; second, its consumption cl given the first-period outcome
and its committed a for the second period. We expect the inability to
re-allocate labor in the second period to lead the country to pursue a
less risky policy in the first period.
The maximization problem can be expressed as:
Max EU(cl) + EU(c2)
where c2 -' ( + 2 - 2R) - cl
The first-order condition is:
O - E([u'(cl)][dcl/da]) + E{[u'(c2)][l+2-2R-(dcl/d)]}
After the first period's uncertainty is resolved, we know that cl
will be chosen such that: u'(cl) - El[u'(c2)], where E1 denotes the
expected value at the end of period one. By the law of iterated
expectations, we have: E[u'(cl)] - E[u'(c2)], the absence of a subscript
on the expectation operator denoting the expectation at the end of
period zero. We can use this envelope condition on first-period
consumption to eliminate the terms involving dcl/da. Thus, the first-
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order condition is simply:
O - E([u'(c2)][2l+Z2-2R]).
We can calculate the value of [u'(c2)][ + z2 - 2R] for each of the
four equally probable outcomes for the first and second period shocks:
(+,+), (+,-), (-,+), and (-,-). The first-order condition is then:
o - 2d+?2 + ..2.. + 2d + 2d-2a
H+2ad-c+ H-cl+ H-cl
'
H-2aa-cl
where H - 2ad + 2R
cl+ - first-period consumption after
positive first-period shock
cl' - first-period consumption after
negative first-period shock
We can solve explicitly for c+ and cl-, given a, using the fact
that marginal utility of period-one consumption must equal expected
marginal utility of period-two consumption. So,
- 1 [ 1 + 1 ]
C 1 2 yl+a(d+a)+R-cl yl+a(d-a)+R-cl
Defining b - y + R + ad, we use the quadratic formula to obtain:
cl - 3b - [b2 + 8a2a2 10.5
4
(We can reject the positive square root of the determinant by
considering the limiting case of a - 0, for which c - b/2 clearly
maximizes utility.)
Actual values of cl+ and cl- are easily obtained by substituting y +
- R + a(d+o) and yl - R + a(d-a) into the definition of b, then
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expanding the expression for c. Substituting these values into the
first-order condition (8) will produce an implicit solution for a. The
explicit solution, calculated by computer, appears too complicated to
yield new insights. Because of risk-aversion, we know that the a chosen
in this example without re-allocation of labor will be lower than the
corresponding a in which labor can be re-allocated.
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WHAT CAUSED CHINA TO LEAVE THE SILVER STANDARD. 1934-1935?
I. Introduction
The experience of China in the early 1930's has been regarded by
historians as a striking example of a small open economy devastated by a
single external shock. The shock in this case consisted of a tr'?ling of
the real world price of silver from 1932 to 1935,13 resulting primarily
from silver purchases by the United States government of an unprecedented
magnitude. Since China's monetary system at the time was based on silver,
this remarkable increase in the price of silver caused a sharp
appreciation of the Chinese currency as well as widespread deflation.
Large exports of silver from China ensued---in two years, China's monetary
silver fell by one-fourthl4---and after several failed attempts to curb the
silver outflow, China ultimately abandoned the silver standard in November
1935. Commenting on the U.S. silver policy, Friedman and Schwartz (1963)
wrote: "The silver program is a dramatic illustration of how a course of
action, undertaken by one country for domestic reasons and relatively
unimportant to that country, can yet have far-reaching consequences for
other countries if it affects a monetary medium of those countries. China
was most affected."
The case of China also holds special interest because the Chinese
13 In the U.S., silver increased from 24.6 cents in December 1932 to
81 cents on 26 April 1935, a 229% increase. The corresponding increase
in U.S. wholesale prices was 23%.
14 China's monetary silver fell from C$ 2.275 billion at the end of
1933 to C$ 1.703 billion ounces at the end of 1935, according to the
estimates of Rawski (1984).
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silver standard represented an unusual hybrid of fixed and flexible
exchange rates. In the early 1930's, China was the only major country
adhering to a silver standard in a world predominantly tied to gold.
Although Chinese currency floated against other currencies in line with
the world price of silver, the Chinese dollar was inextricably linked to
silver. The large circulation of silver coins made it impossible to
revalue or devalue in terms of silver. Furthermore, as in all metal-
backed regimes, China's money supply depended on its stock of monetary
silver, which in turn varied with its balance-of-payments, as well as
speculative trade in silver.
According to Friedman and Schwartzl5 , an exogenous rise in the world
price of silver led to a real appreciation, a fall in net exports, and
thus a balance-of-payments deficit, necessitating an outflow of silver.
The silver outflow in turn implied a monetary contraction, which resulted
in deflation and, given some rigidities in prices, a sharp fall in output.
China's ultimate departure from silver is thus attributed to exogenous
forces, primarily the U.S. silver purchases, that compelled China to
abandon the silver standard in November 1935 when the depression became
too severe.
Recent research on prewar China, however, has demonstrated that this
line of reasoning may be inconsistent with some of the facts. Rawski
(1984), for example, points out that although silver did flow out of China
in 1934 and 1935, increased circulation of bank notes redeemable for
15 This interpretation is shared by many other, including official
Chinese reports during the crisis. For other similar accounts, see:
Paris (1938), Westerfield (1936), Lin (1936).
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silver more than outweighed the loss of silver, implying that the money
supply did not truly contract. Brandt (1985) shows that many prices in
China were not rigid but extremely flexible, and in fact were determined
by international commodity arbitrage based on fluctuations in silver.
This would imply that deflation resulted directly from a nominal
appreciation, not via a monetary contraction. Myers (1986), Rawski
(1988), and Brandt and Sargent (1988)---citing levels of capital
investment, transportation data, and new sectoral estimates of GDP---
assert that, contrary to many contemporary reports, there was in actuality
little or no depression at all in China, that deflation had virtually no
effect on output.
Brandt and Sargent (1988) offer an alternative interpretation of
China's experience in the early 1930's that better incorporates these
recent findings: they explain the rapid outflow of silver not as the
inevitable consequence of a sudden worsening in the trade balance, but as
the expenditure of a windfall gain due to silver's real appreciation.
Higher real silver prices permitted a lower stock of silver to support an
unchanged level of real balances. Therefore, China could export silver,
enjoying a one-time gain in consumption, but leaving the real economy
otherwise unchanged. While the Chinese dollar did appreciate against
other currencies and Chinese prices did fall, there was no real
appreciation, no real output contraction, in fact, no economic crisis at
all. The government's decision in November 1935 to nationalize silver
and replace China's silver-backed currency with fiat money is viewed
simply as a deliberate attempt by the Chinese government to increase its
share of the capital gain resulting from silver's appreciation.
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This paper proposes a third interpretation of China's last few years
on the silver standard: that the large silver outflows from China arose
from neither a growing trade deficit nor a windfall gain but rather from
speculative sales of silver---and this caused the Chinese silver standard
to collapse. Silver exports from China were far greater, in fact more
than twenty times greater, in 1934 and 1935 than in 1932 and 1933. Yet,
in 1934 and 1935, China's trade deficit was narrowing and the ecline in
the Chinese price level was decelerating. Neither Friedman and Schwartz's
nor Brandt and Sargent's explanation of why silver left China is
consisteric with this phenomenal surge in silver exports in 1934 and 1935.
Although silver prices had been rising and the Chinese price level
falling since 1931, it was in early 1934 that two conditions became strong
enough to drive silver out of China in the form of speculative capital
flight: (1) It had become clear that intervention in the silver market
by the United States government was likely to drive world silver prices
to new artificial highs; and (2) The Chinese government, threatened by
the consequent currency appreciation and price deflation, declared that
it would take drastic action if American purchases caused too great an
increase in silver prices.
The American commitment to higher silver prices had been
strengthening throughout 1933 as a succession of bills authorized the
Treasury to pay considerably more than the market price in acquiring
silver. By mid-1934, any remaining doubts were dispelled: under the
Silver Purchase Act, the U.S. would most definitely purchase large amounts
of silver over the next few years, and would be willing to pay more than
double the going price.
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The Chinese fear of an artificial rise in silver prices was
perceptible as early as the beginning of 1933. Rumors of a silver embargo
circulated, but no action was taken.16 An academic study appeared in
December 1933 indicating the harmful effects of higher silver prices.17
In March 1934, in its ratification of the international silver agreement,
the Chinese government warned that it would take "whatever action it may
deem appropriate" to counteract the damage caused by rising silver
prices.18 Indeed, beginning September 1934, China took action in the form
of capital controls that became increasingly stringent---to the point of
a virtual embargo on silver in the spring of 1935, and the abandonment of
the silver standard in November 1935.
These conditions, i.e. America's determination to support silver
prices and China's strong aversion to deflation and silver export, clearly
pointed to an eventual suspension of the silver standard. This
combination of forces led those holding silver within China to seek to
export it. Foreigners and Chinese alike sent large amounts of silver out
of China, first legally then via smuggling, recognizing the probability
of tighter controls later. As the price of silver rose further and the
Chinese government protested more loudly, the silver standard's demise
appeared imminent.
Although it appeared in mid-1934 that silver would rise further,
speculators' incentives to redeem paper for silver then to ship this
16 Leavens, Silver Money, p. 221.
17 Leavens, Silver Money, p. 223.
18 Tang, China's New Currency System, p. 65.
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silver out of China were independent of whether one expected the price of
silver to rise further or to begin to fall. The sensible strategy for
anyone holding paper or silver money in China was to convert the funds to
foreign currency or to transfer them abroad. For example, holders of
silver expecting silver to rise would want to move the silver abroad to
avoid the potential export restrictions. Holders of silver expecting
silver to fall would want to sell the silver for foreign currency, since
the Chinese dollar would depreciate with a fall in silver. Holders of
Chinese dollars expecting a rise in silver (and therefore either a
suspension of convertibility from paper to silver, or a silver embargo)
would want to convert their notes to coins and again ship the silver
abroad. Holders of Chinese dollars expecting silver to fall should obtain
foreign exchange; since exchange transactions were restricted, this
necessitated an export of silver to purchase the foreign exchange.
Given the genuine threat of China's imposing tighter capital
controls, it appears most reasonable to view China's silver exports as
speculative "capital flight," rather than the financing of an
appreciation-induced trade deficit or the balance-of-payments deficit
permitted by a one-time windfall gain.
This paper will be organized as follows. Section II reviews the
historical facts surrounding the silver episode in China in the early
1930's. Section III evaluates three alternative explanations of the
events---Friedman and Schwartz's, Brandt and Sargent's, and this paper's.
Section IV concludes.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE CHINESE SILVER STANDARD. 1932-193519
1. Currency Appreciation and Price Deflation in China. 1932-1933
China's adherence to a silver standard benefited China at the outset
of the Depression, as the world price of silver fell, the Chinese currency
depreciated, and China's exports were stimulated in a period of depressed
world trade. Commodity prices in terms of Chinese currency actually rose,
permitting China to avoid the deflation afflicting many other countries
at the time.
In 1932, these trends reversed themselves: China experienced an
exchange rate appreciation, deflation in prices, and a severe decline in
exports. The departure from the gold standard by Britain in September
1931, and by Japan in December 1931 led to a nominal appreciation of
silver, and thus the Chinese currency. From 1931 to 1932, the Chinese
dollar appreciated 23.7% against the pound and 70.1% against the yen,
although the Chinese currency did depreciate by 2.9% against the U.S.
dollar. Wholesale prices in China fell by 11% but since prices abroad
were falling or nearly constant, the Chinese currency experienced a real
appreciation.
Exports from China declined substantially, by about 45%, in 1932.
This decline in exports resulted not only from the real appreciation of
the Chinese dollar, but also the deepening of the Depression in the U.S.
and elsewhere---world industrial production fell 17% in 1932, and the
Japanese takeover of Manchuria, a region that had been generating about
19 An overview of China's macroeconomy and financial system is
presented in Appendix A.
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one-third of all Chinese exports.
Although imports also declined in 1932, exports fell by more,
causing China's trade deficit to widen from C$ 816 million to C$ 867
million according to official records, from C$ 584 million to C$ 746
million in "corrected" reports. Invisibles registered a small improvement
(the fall in the Chinese dollar value of foreign debt service more than
offset the decline in overseas remittances), but the current account
showed a worsening of about C$ 100 million. While capital items such as
foreign investments and loans increased slightly, the Chinese balance-of-
payments position showed a deficit of C$ 266 million, approximately C$ 100
million larger than in 1931. In 1932, China exported silver for the
first time since 1917.
47
2. Flow of Silver from China,. 1934
China's silver exports amounted to C$ 10 million in 1932, increased
slightly to C$ 14 million in 1933, but as indicated in Table 10, did not
truly gain momentum until mid-1934 as the U.S. began major purchases under
the Silver Purchase Act.20 Although official exports declined sharply as
of mid-October 1934 in response to newly imposed capital controls, total
silver exports for 1934 (not including smuggled exports) were C$ 256.7
million, about 20 times greater than in 1932 or 1933. Since a standard
Chinese silver dollar was equivalent to 0.81666 ounces of silver, 1934
exports represented more than 10% of China's entire monetary stock of
silver, which was estimated at 1700 million ounces in January 1933.21
Most of the export of silver in 1934 can be attributed to silver
destocking by foreign banks. Considerable silver had accumulated in
foreign banks from 1929 to 1932, when the low price on world markets
discouraged the conversion of silver into foreign currency. Silver stocks
in foreign banks fell from C$ 275.7 million at the end of 1933 to C$ 54.7
million at the end of 1934, a decline of C$ 221 million, or 85%! In terms
of dollar amounts, this transfer of silver was concentrated in just a few
major banks: Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (C$ 76.4 million),
Chartered Bank (C$ 68.9 million), Banque de l'Indochine (C$ 16.9 million),
Yokohama Specie Bank (C$ 15.7 million), and National City Bank of New York
(C$ 10.8 million) were responsible for about 85% of foreign banks' silver
20 See Appendix B for background information on the U.S. Silver
Policy.
21 Leavens, Silver Money, p. 369.
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destocking.22
During the same period, the four government banks, known as the
"Central Banking Group," actually increased their stocks of silver by C$
35.5 million, from C$ 192.2 million at the end of 1933 to C$ 227.7 million
at the end of 1934. Changes in silver stocks were distributed as follows:
Central Bank of China (+ C$ 29.0 million), Bank of China (- C$ 20.6
million), Bank of Communications (+ C$ 20.6 million), and Farmers Bank of
China (+ C$ 3.6 million).2 3
Commenting on the sudden flow of silver from China, Leavens wrote:
"In part these exports arose from the transfer of funds abroad by
individuals and corporations who decided that it was well to take their
profits without further delay. Many were influenced by rumors and
expectations that, if the price of silver should rise considerably, China
would be forced to place restrictions on the export of Lhe white metal or
to devalue the Chinese dollar....Although the Government from time tn time
issued denials of any such intentions, there was real justification for
apprehension on this score....the same possibility of embargo or
devaluation influenced banks and at least one large corporation to ship
silver abroad for safekeeping....Thus, the urge to export silver before
it was too late was increased, in a vicious circle."2 4
22 Tamagna, Banking and Finance in China, p. 104.
23 Tamagna, Banking and Finance in China, p. 139.
24 Leavens, "American Silver Policy and China," Harvard Business
Review, Autumn 1935, vol. 14, no. 1, p. 52.
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3. China's Reaction to the U.S. Silver Policy. 1934-35
Although American advocates of higher silver prices had claimed that
an appreciation of silver would help China,2 5 the Chinese government
realized at a fairly early stage that a rapid increase in the price of
silver could prove detrimental to the Chinese economy. Throughout 1933,
the Chinese financial community had exhibited some apprehension towards
higher silver prices. In signing the London Silver Agreement on 21 March
1934, China added the caveat that its government would "consider itself
at liberty to take whatever action it may deem appropriate, if, in its
opinion, changes in the relative values of gold and silver adversely
affect the economic condition of the Chinese people."26 On 23 September
1934, the Chinese government protested directly to the U.S. government,
describing the harmful effects of the U.S. silver policy on China, and the
likely consequences of a further rise in silver: "Since 1931, the rising
value of silver in terms of foreign currencies has involved severe
deflation and economic loss to China....A further material silver price
increase would cause very serious injury to China, possibly severe
panic..." 27
China also requested that the U.S. refrain from additional open
market purchases of silver, but did propose exchanging Chinese silver for
25 Excellent refutations of this illogical claim can be found in
Frank D. Graham, "The Fall in the Value of Silver and its Consequences,"
Journal of Political Economy (1931), vol. 39. no. 4, pp. 425-470, and in
T.J. Kreps, "The Price of Silver and Chinese Purchasing Power," Quarterly
Journal of Economics (1934), vol. 48, pp. 245-287.
26 Tang, China's New Currency System, p. 65.
27 Ibid, p.66.
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American gold, intimating that China was contemplating leaving silver in
favor of a gold standard. The Chinese government wrote: "China should
not alone maintain the silver standard, and is considering gradual
introduction of a gold-basis currency which would necessitate acquiring
gold. " 28
The U.S. politely responded on 12 October 1934 that it would "give
the closest possible attention to the possibilities of so arranging the
time, place, and quantity of its purchases" to minimize the adverse impact
on China, but refused to relinquish the objective of the "enhancement and
stabilization of the price of silver." The U.S. moreover showed no
interest in a direct exchange of precious metals with China, pointing out
the existence of free markets in both gold and silver.2 9
28 Ibid, pp. 66-67.
29 Ibid, p. 67.
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4. Export Restrictions on Silver. 1934-35
When it became clear to the Chinese that remonstrating with the
United States would prove futile, the Chinese began to take measures to
protect their rapidly dwindling silver supply. On 15 October 1934, the
Chinese government raised the export duty on silver from 2.25% to 10% and
imposed an adjustable "equalization charge" designed to annul any profits
that might arise from unequal prices of silver in China and abroad. This
measure aimed to achieve two purposes: to stem the increasing flow of
silver from China, and to avoid further deflation by preventing the
continued appreciation of the Chinese dollar. Of course, in imposing the
equalization charge, China had effectively divorced herself from a true
silver standard.
The equalization charge was constructed to equalize the
"theoretical" exchange rate, or the value of the .866 ounces of standard
silver contained in a Chinese dollar, and the market-determined exchange
rate of the Chinese dollar on foreign currency exchanges. The difference
between these two rates, expressed as a percentage of the market rate,
minus the export tax of 10% for silver or 7.75% for standard silver
dollars, determined the equalization charge. Any attempt to export silver
would therefore imply zero profits from the silver resale and a loss of
shipping, interest, and other costs.
Official silver exports from China decreased immediately in response
to the equalization charge, as shown in Table 10. Official records show
an even greater decline in 1935: China registered net imports of silver
in every month but May from January through November 1935. By official
count, the equalization charge proved a highly effective form of exchange
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control.
On exchange markets, the immediate response to the imposition of the
equalization charge was a fall in the value of the Chinese dollar, which
declined more than 10% in the first few days the charge was in effect.30
Although the equalization charge technically constituted a departure from
a true silver standard, Chinese officials vigorously denied any rumors of
a future devaluation or nationalization of silver.
The equalization charge was initially set at 8% on 16 October 1934,
and was meant to be adjusted daily. In practice, the equalization charge
was set slightly lower than the original formula dictated, but because of
shipping costs, it would still have proved unprofitable to export silver,
assuming payment of all taxes.31 Of course, smuggling silver out of China
without paying taxes remained economically attractive.
The instant depreciation of the Chinese dollar when the equalization
charge was first imposed convinced policymakers that too high an
equalization charge would depress the Chinese dollar and widen the
"discrepancy" between the market exchange rate and the theoretical (i.e.
based on silver) exchange rate. Too wide a gap, it was feared, would
encourage smuggling. Therefore, on 1 April 1935, in what became known as
the "gentleman's agreement," the Ministry of Finance requested that
Chinese and foreign banks refrain from further export of silver. Since
only banks were legally permitted to ship silver, this "gentleman's
30 Leavens, Silver Money, p. 301.
31 A.B. Lewis and Lien Wang,"Changes in Currency and Prices in
China," Economic Facts (1936), no.1, pp. 1-65, calculates on a daily basis
the potential gain from silver export from August 1934 through May 1936.
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agreement" constituted a virtual embargo on silver. Having secured the
co-ooperation of the Shanghai banks, the Chinese government decided not
to raise the equalization charge even as the "discrepancy" widened.
Smuggling became still more profitable: from April through October 1935,
the Chinese dollar in silver was typically worth about 25% more than its
paper value.32
As the drain of China's silver, especially through smuggling,
appeared increasingly serious, a growing number of national and regional
regulations were imposed to conserve China's silver stocks while
maintaining convertibility domestically. Since silver was smuggled out
primarily through Hong Kong and Japan, many restrictions governing the
internal transport of silver were imposed in the hope of preventing silver
in other parts of China from reaching the borders. Dates and details of
the important national and regional regulations pertaining to silver
export or transport are presented in Tables 7 and 8.
32 See "Changes in Currency and Prices of China" for calculations.
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5. Smuggling of Silver from China. 1934-1935
It is estimated that about C$ 200 million, or 150 million ounces of
silver, was smuggled out of China in 1935, as well as about C$ 20 million
in the last few months of 1934. Chinese silver was funneled through Hong
Kong and Japan, wherefrom the metal ultimately found its way to London.
British trade statistics indicate that in 1935 Britain imported 85.6
million ounces from Japan and 73 million ounces from Hong Kong.3 3 In 1934,
Japan had exported only 7 million ounces and Hong Kong a negligible
quantity. In 1933, total monetary silver in Japan was 107 million ounces,
but it is not this silver that left Japan in 1935, since at the prevailing
exchange rates it would have been uneconomical to melt down Japanese
coins.3 4 The 1935 Review of London silver dealers Mocatta and Goldsmid
noted that "While some 7 millions [of Japanese 1935 silver exports] may
have come from Japanese mines, the bulk of it is silver smuggled out of
China."35 Hong Kong's monetary silver in 1933 was estimated at 162 million
fine ounces, some in the form of coins in circulation.3 6 Silver exported
from Hong Kong most likely included some silver originally from Hong Kong
and other silver that had been smuggled into Hong Kong from China.
Data on internal movements of silver within China confirm that
silver followed a circuitous route within China either to the North then
Japan, or to the South then Hong Kong. Statistics on internal flows in
33 Tang, China's New Currency System, p. 115.
34 Leavens, "Silver Coins to the Melting Pot: The Known Supply Await
Higher Prices," The Annalist, 5 July 1935, p. 3.
35 Tang, China's New Currency System, p. 115.
36 Leavens, Silver Money, p. 369.
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1934 indicate that monthly net exports of silver from Shanghai to the
interior (non-Shanghai) increased from C$ 0.7 million in September to CS$
9 million in October, C$ 43 million in November, and C 35 million in
December.3 7 The sudden increase in shipment from Shanghai to the interior
in October and November suggests that silver originally destined for
direct export from Shanghai was diverted to the interior, eventually to
be exported, since the silver export controls of 15 October 1935 were most
strictly enforced in Shanghai. Although China officially imported about
CS$ 7 million in silver from January through October 1935,38 silver stocks
in Shanghai banks declined by CS 20 million from 31 December 1934 to 06
November 1935, when the monetary reform was imposed.39 In other words, in
1935 Shanghai banks shipped at least C$ 27 million to banks in cities
other than Shanghai where smuggling was easier. Of course, silver
originally in circulation in Shanghai or elsewhere, or originally held in
banks or hoards outside Shanghai also contributed significantly to the
total quantity smuggled in 1935.
37 Tang, China's New Currency System, p. 71.
38 Central Bank of China Bulletin (1936), p. 85.
39 League of Nations, Commercial Banks (1935), p. 53 and Lin, The New
Monetary System of China, p. 55.
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Smtuggling and the "Discrepancy"
Interregional patterns of exchange rates and prices reveal insights
into the economics of smuggling and can begin to explain the puzzling
"discrepancy" between actual and theoretical exchange rates of the Chinese
dollar. In brief, silver increased in value near the borders of Japan and
Hong Kong. While paper money remained convertible into silver at par in
Shanghai, the ratio of silver's value to paper's value rose with increased
proximity to the world market, reflecting the costs associated with
illegal transport of silver within China.
An excellent example of this phenomenon could be found in Canton,
the closest major Chinese city to Hong Kong, and thus a logical conduit
for smuggled silver. Canton used its own silver-based currency, the
Canton dollar, containing about 80% of the silver in the standard Chinese
(Shanghai) dollar. Assuming complete convertibility in both cities and
the absence of any restrictions on the movement of silver, a Shanghai
dollar should have been worth about 1.25 Canton dollars, as indeed it was
until about mid-October 1934, when the Canton (paper) dollar began to
appreciate against the Shanghai (paper) dollar in Canton currency
exchanges. By May 1935, the Canton (paper) dollar was worth more than the
Shanghai (paper) dollar though the former was redeemable for less silver.
How can this be explained? The Canton paper dollar was convertible
into silver in Canton, whereas the Shanghai currency was convertible into
silver only in Shanghai, i.e. much farther from Hong Kong. Silver in
Canton was evidently worth considerably more in Canton than Shanghai,
reflecting the restrictions on shipping silver from Shanghai to Canton.
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Note that in Canton, the exchange rate between the Shanghai silver dollar
coin and the Canton dollar remained relatively constant, since once the
silver Shanghai dollar physically arrived in Canton, its value had already
increased.
Movements in price levels in different cities in China also
reflected the geographical differences in the value of silver. A
comparative study of prices notes that for the years 1932, 1933, and the
first half of 1934, commodity prices in Hong Kong, Canton, and other
cities in China moved approximately in unison.40 In late 1934 and 1935,
these price levels began to diverge as the value of silver varied
according to location. As the world price of silver increased, price
levels fell more in Canton than in Shanghai, more in Hong Kong than in
Canton, implying that money (paper or silver) had become worth relatively
less in Shanghai than Canton, less in Canton than Hong Kong.41 In Hong
Kong, where the full silver standard had been maintained with no
restriction, prices declined by 17% from 1934 to 1935. In Canton, which
enjoyed relatively good access to Hong Kong but was still part of China,
prices in 1935 fell by 10%. Finally, in Shanghai, where the distance to
the free market was considerably greater, commodity prices declined by
less than 1%.42 In sum, silver was more valuable in Hong Kong than Canton,
40 Because the basket of commodities used in the price index varied
across cities, some minor deviations across cities can be attributed to
relative price changes across commodities. Economic Facts, p. 98
41 These price levels are denominated in local currency. No
distinction is made between paper and silver money as local paper remained
convertible at par into silver, i.e. a Canton paper dollar could be
converted into silver in Canton.
42 Economic Facts, p. 95.
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more valuable in Canton than Shanghai.
In North China, where the standard Chinese dollar (rather than a
separate currency) was used, anecdotal evidence suggests that silver was
more valuable in cities near Japan, such as Tientsin, than in Shanghai.
Although notes remained at all times redeemable for silver at par in
Shanghai, observers noted: "After the first half of 1934, premiums for
silver over banknotes began to appear, and from this time forward the
relation between paper money and silver varied in different cities and at
different times."43 In April 1935, for example, a small premium for silver
was reported in Tientsin, according to American sources.44 Other specific
observations are listed in Table 9.
43 Economic Facts, p. 99.
44 U.S. Monthly Trade Report, May 1935.
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6. The Departure from Silver. November 1935
Fears of devaluation mounted sharply beginning in mid-October 1935.
From 14 October 1935 to 2 November 1935, the day before the currency
reform was announced, the Chinese dollar depreciated by nearly 20% while
the price of silver remained unchanged.4 5 At the same time, there was a
rush to exchange cash for real goods, causing domestic prices of
commodities such as cotton, wheat, and bean oil to be bid upwards by about
15% in just over two weeks.4 6 When the currency reform actually came, the
Chinese dollar did not depreciate further, but was fixed in terms of U.S.
dollars or sterling Just below the market rates prevailing on 2 November
1935.
A large premium for cash over forward delivery of foreign exchange
developed, implying extremely high interest rates in the Chinese dollar.
In September 1935, for example, when the spot exchange rate of the Chinese
dollar was 33.375 U.S. cents, it was observed that the value of the
Chinese dollar in forward contracts was 33.25 U.S. cents for October,
32.25 U.S. cents for November.47 The implicit differential between U.S.
and Chinese interest rates would be [(33.25/32.25) - 1], or 3.1% per
month. Those with access 'o foreign exchange markets could "buy [foreign
exchange] for cash, sell [foreign exchange] for November delivery at rates
which gave a return of approximately 35%. 48 According to one source,
45 Lin, The New Monetary System of China, pp. 76-77.
46 Ibid, p. 77.
47 Finance and Commerce, 30 October 1935, vol. 26, p. 464.
48 Ibid
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"Everyone was buying foreign exchange, few wanted to sell." 49
The currency reform that many had begun to anticipate months earlier
was finally enacted on 3 November 1935, with the following statement by
Dr. H.H. K'ung, Minister of Finance:
"...China's currency has become seriously overvalued. There
has been severe internal deflation, with growing unemployment,
widespread bankruptcies, flight of capital abroad, fall in
government revenues and an adverse balance of payments. For
the three and half months commencing July, 1934 exports of
sivler amounted to more than 200 million dollars, and it was
evident that unless immediate measures were taken, the country
would be drained of its silver stock....In order to conserve
the currency reserves of the country and to effect lasting
measures of currency and banking reform, [silver will be
nationalized and the silver standard abandoned.]"50
49 Leavens, Silver Money, p. 312.
50 Finance and Commerce, 6 November 1935, vol. 26, p. 487.
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7. Effects of Silver Outflow and Price Deflation. 1934-1935
According to contemporary Chinese reports, the combination of price
deflation and monetary contraction created a severe economic crisis, with
a shortage of capital, widespread bankruptcies, and an overall
agricultural and industrial decline. In a speech on 10 October 1935,
Finance Minister H.H. Kung stated that "an acute monetary situtation of
near-panic proportions, throughout the country at large and Shanghai in
particular, has arisen" and noted that "business failures and unemployment
are widespread. 51
Available aggregate estimates of China's GDP, while highly
approximate, suggest that output contracted by about 9% in 1934, largely
because of crop failure that caused a 12% decline in agriculture, but
otherwise remained approximately constant in real terms from 1932 to
1935.52
Sectoral surveys of Chinese industry indicate a mixed performance
in the years 1934 and 1935. Cotton-spinning, silk, matches, and
cigarettes suffered a considerable decline in 1934, but flour, rubber
goods, tea, coal, and cement performed favorably.53 An monthly index of
production in China based on the five industries subject to a consolidated
tax (cigarettes, cotton yarn, flour, matches, and cement) shows steady
51 Tang, China's New Monetary System, p. 76.
52 Brandt and Sargent, p. 31.
53 "An Economic Survey of China for 1934" in the Central Bank of
China Bulletin (1935). These statistics, however, are of questionable
accuracy: for example, the cotton-spinning industry in 1934 "faced grave
difficulties" according to one report, but grew 13.4% according to
another!
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improvement in the overall index each year from 1932 through early-1935,
though production of cigarettes and matches falls.54 Both industry and
agriculture are reported to have improved considerably during the
reflation that began in November 1935.
Can any decline in output be attributed to a monetary contraction
associated with the outflow of silver? Since China's monetary base did
not contract, but in fact expanded, contemporary reports linking the
economic downturn to monetary stringency must be considered questionable.
Although China's monetary silver declined sharply in 1934 and 1935, an
increase in the circulation of banknotes more than compensated for the
decline in silver, as shown in Table 11. Deposits too show no sign of
decline. Although China's money supply did not shrink, deflation alone
may have caused some economic contraction if the Chinese economy was
characterized by some nominal rigidities.
Nominal Rigidities in Chinese Factor Prices
The presence of nominal rigidities would imply a contraction in
output during a deflationary period. It is unclear to what extent Chinese
markets exhibited such rigidities, and thus how plausible we must consider
contemporary descriptions of depression. A 1938 study on the flexibility
of prices in China found that although wholesale and retail prices tended
to adjust with equal speed, there existed rigidities in factor prices---
S4 Central Bank of China Bulletin (1936), pp. 19-21.
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debt payments, taxes, rents, and farm and industrial wages.55 Despite a
20% fall in basic commodity prices, and a 15% fall in the cost of living,
industrial wages in Shanghai declined by only 2% from 1931 to 1934.56 That
the market for labor did not function as an auction market ith perfectly
flexible wages is evident in the following passage from the Maritime
Customs Decennial Report 1922-1931: "At the conclusion of the last
decennial period there was little or no trades union activity in Shanghai.
Today nearly every trade is organised, and the various unions boast a
membership of approximately 200,000."57 For the 1930-1933 period, sectoral
indices show a large decline in the volume of business in many Shanghai
industries. 58
In the agricultural sector, although the relative prices of
manufactures and commodities hardly changed, difficulties arose from the
inflexibility of taxes, wages, rents, and interest payments. Owner farms
represented slightly more than half of all Chinese farms, while tenants
comprised 25%, part-owners 20%.59 Expenses such as rent or family labor
were generally paid in kind rather than on a fixed cash basis, though a
1934 survey found that about 20% (versus 5% in 1920-1925) of Chinese
tenant farmers paid a fixed cash rent rather than an output-contingent
55 J.R. Raeburn and K.Hu, "The Flexibility of Prices in China,"
Economic Facts, no.9, April 1938, pp.3 9 5-40 5.
56 Ibid, p. 402.
57 Maritime Customs, Decennial Report 1922-1931, p. 21.
58 Lin, The New Monetary System of China, p. 60.
59 Buck, Chinese Farm Economy, p. 145.
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rent.6 0. According to a 1920-1925 survey of 2866 farms, over half engaged
some hired labor, which on average amounted to 36% of operating expenses
excluding family labor.6 1 In 1933, about 56% of Chinese farmers were in
debt for cash, paying an average annual interest rate of 34%, according
to a nationwide survey.62 Studies also indicate that price paid by farmers
were less flexible upward or downward than prices received by farmers.63
In sum, both the industrial and agricultural sectors were
characterized by some rigidity in factor prices.
60 Feuerwerker, p. 36.
' Ibid, pp. 74, 77.
62 Silver and Prices in China, pp. 95-96.
63 Silver and Prices in China, pp. 50-51.
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China's Reaction to Deflation
The economic hardships associated with China's deflation remain a
subject of controversy. Both contemporary and historical accounts of the
period report large reductions in output, widespread unemployment, and
other symptoms of economic contraction. Recent research, however,
suggests that the real costs of the deflation may have been exaggerated,
as many indicators of aggregate activity show no slowdown at all.
Theoretically, we know that some difficulties are likely to have arisen
because of the sluggish adjustment of wages, rents, taxes, and debts but
in actuality these difficulties may have been brief and confined to a few
sectors. The rapid outflow of silver, which indeed reached spectacular
proportions in 1934 and 1935, may have lead some observers to overstate
the decline in economic activity.
What the Chinese government perceived as a widespread "crisis" in
1934 and 1935 in fact constituted transitory sectoral shocks and changes
in relative prices, none of which can be directly linked to either the
silver outflow or the price deflation. For example, a severe drought in
central China in the summer of 1934 raised the price of rice relative to
other crops.6 4 Overall, agricultural output fell by about 12% in 1934,
but returned to normal in 1935.65 Reduced purchasing power in the drought-
stricken regions lowered the domestic demand for manufactures.
64 John R. Raeburn and Hu Kwoh-Hwa, "The Values of Soybean Oil,
Cotton Cloth, and Kerosene in Terms of Rice," Economic Facts, May 1937,
no. 5, pp. 219-224.
65 Myers, "The World Depression and the Chinese Economy, 1930-1936,"
p. 9.
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In the manufacturing sector, certain key industries such as cotton
spinning and silk reeling faced adverse price and demand shocks
originating abroad. The Chinese cotton spinning industry in 1934 was hurt
by rapid output growth by Japanese mills within China, which from 1933 to
1934 increased yarn production by 100% and cloth production by 44%.66 A
rise in material costs, which comprised 80% of total costs, resulted in
some cotton spinning firms' producing at a loss.67 Though the silk
industry had been undergoing a long-term decline, foreign (primarily
American and French) demand for Chinese silk fell especially sharply in
1934 as a result of Japanese competition and the continued development of
rayon. A crisis caused by a transitory slump in silk prices in mid-1935 -
--the price fell from C$ 500 in January to C$ 380 in June but recovered
to C$ 800 in November68--- may have been wrongly attributed to the silver
situation because of the coincidence in timing.
What is especially interesting about this episode is that China's
reaction to the deflation may have caused greater damage to China's silver
standard than the deflation itself. Since the government perceived
deflation as extremely costly, we know that a further appreciation of the
Chinese currency was likely to cause strong governmental reaction,
including possible suspension of the silver standard, should silver's
price rise sufficiently. Although the real effects of deflation were
66 Central Bank of China Bulletin (1935), p. 35.
67 Ibid, p. 34.
68 Central Bank of China Bulletin (1936), p. 25. Of course, the
appreciation of the Chinese dollar in mid-1935 did aggravate the terms-
of-trade shock. In U.S. dollars, the New York Exchange price recovered
from $ 1.30 in May to $ 1.98 in November.
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small, it was of paramount importance to the government to avoid or
minimize these effects. They adopted a somewhat "alarmist" attitude,
imposing increasingly stricter controls on silver transport in the hope
of preventing too rapid an appreciation of the Chinese dollar. In the
end, this merely fueled expectations that the government would eventually
become desperate enough to sever all ties with silver, and thereby induced
large silver exports. This outcome is especially ironic in that the real
economic costs of deflation appear to have been minimal.
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III. INTERPRETATION OF CHINA'S SILVER CRISIS. 1934-1935
A. Evaluation of Friedman and Schwartz's Interpretation
Friedman and Schwartz explain the outflow of silver from China as
the capital account counterpart to an increase in China's trade deficit,
which in turn they attribute to a real exchange rate appreciation. The
adverse impact on China's trade balance is the focus of Friedman and
Schwartz's discussion of the how the trebling of the price of silver
affected China.6 9 The silver exports necessary to finance the trade
deficit would result in a monetary contraction, causing output and prices
to decline. Friedman and Schwartz report that "students of the period are
unanimous that the boon [due to a rise in silver] was more than offset by
the economic effects of the drastic deflationary pressure imposed on China
and the resulting economic disturbances."70
In brief, the line of causality in Friedman and Schwartz's argument
can be stated as:
(1) A rise in the world price of silver caused the
Chinese currency to appreciate in real terms.
(2) The real appreciation caused China's trade balance
to worsen.
69 Friedman and Schwartz draw the following analogy: "... under the
impact of the silver-purchase program, [silver's] initial price had nearly
trebled. The effect on China's international trade position can perhaps
be appreciated best by expressing these figures in terms more familiar
to the reader. It was as if, when Britain and the United States were both
on the gold standard in the 1920's, Britain had been confronted over the
course of two years with a rise in the dollar price of the pound sterling
from $ 4.86 to nearly $ 15.00, resulting from changes in the U.S. gold
price, without any change in the pound price at which Britain was
obligated to sell gold, and without any substantial change in external or
internal circumstances affecting the supply of or demand for products it
purchased or sold." (p. 490)
70 Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States,
p. 490.
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(3) The deterioration of the trade balance caused China
to export silver.
(4) The export of silver caused China's monetary base
to contract.
(5) The monetary contraction caused a decline in
Chinese output and prices.
Closer examination of actual data, however, reveals that only (1)
is entirely true. Arguments (2) and (3) are partially true, but present
an incomplete description of China's experience and furthermore overlook
the true cause of the silver outflow from China. Recent empirical
findings demonstrate that arguments (4) and (5) are incorrect.71 Each link
in Friedman and Schwartz's logic is evaluated below.
(1) The real appreciation of China's currency discussed in Part II,
Section 1, indeed occurred, beginning in late 1931 and 1932.
(2) As the Chinese dollar appreciated in 1932, China's trade
balance did in fact worsen, the deficit widening steadily from 1931 to
1933, as shown below.
YEAR TRADE DEFICIT72 SILVER EXPORTS
1931 C$ 584 million C$ -70 million
1932 C$ 746 million C$ 10 million
1933 C$ 807 million C$ 14 million
1934 C$ 569 million C$ 280 million
1935 C$ 467 million C$ 289 million
Some of China's trade deterioration in 1932, however, must be
attributed to factors other than a real exchange rate appreciation, such
as the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and the overall decline in world
output. In July 1932, China lost Manchuria, a region that had generated
71 This point is shown by Brandt and Sargent (1987).
72 "corrected" trade figures
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a trade surplus of C$ 165 million in 1928, C$ 160 million in 1929, C$ 132
million in 1930, C$ 271 million in 1931, and C$ 88 million in the first
6 months of 1932.73 An exogenous decline in world economic activity also
contributed to a fall in China's exports in 1932: world industrial
production fell by 15% in 1932, and did not recover to its 1931 level
until 1934.74 The Chinese dollar continued to appreciate through 1935, but
the trade deficit narrowed beginning in 1934, partly as a result of
recovery worldwide. While a worsening in the trade balance did occur,
Friedman and Schwartz somewhat oversimplify its origin.
(3) Non-trade items on both the current account (such as emigrants'
remittances) and the capital account (foreign investment or loans) also
played a major role in determining China's balance-of-payments, and
therefore exports of gold and silver. For example, emigrants'
remittances declined by 9% in 1932, 9% in 1933, and 17% in 1934.7 5 Flows
of foreign investment in China had once dropped by 80% in one year, from
C$ 202 million in 1930 to CS$ 44 million in 1931, but in subsequent years
overall changes in invisible items tended to offset each other. For
example, both emigrants' remittances and the service of foreign loans fall
in 1932, reflecting the appreciation of the Chinese dollar against other
currencies.
The trade deficit, current account deficit, and the combined current
and capital account deficit (exclusive of capital flight and shipment of
73 Bank of China statistics, derived from "China excluding Manchuria"
figures.
74 League of Nations, World Production and Prices.
75 Lin, New Monetary System of China, p. 26.
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gold and silver) all reach a low point in 1933, then begin to recover in
the following year. In 1934, the trade deficit and the current account
deficit, narrowed by one-third; the combined current and capital account
deficit shrunk by about 50% in 1934, and an additional 50% in 1935.
Furthermore, in 1934 and 1935, the years in which by far the
greatest amount of silver left China, the trade deficit had actually
narrowed considerably. While China's trade statistics are not of high
precision, by any measure ("corrected" trade data, official trade data,
official trade data excluding Manchuria), China's trade deficit improved
in both 1934 and 1935. Therefore, a deepening of the trade deficit cannot
be the cause of the extraordinary increase in silver outflow in these two
years.
(4) Since the increase in notes in circulation exceeded the
decrease in monetary silver, it must be true that China's nominal money
supply actually increased even as silver left China.7 6 The fall in prices
implied still greater growth of the real money supply.
(5) By international arbitrage, Chinese dollar prices of many
commodities fell as a direct consequence of the appreciation of the
Chinese currency,77 independent of China's money supply. Output losses,
as discussed in the last section of Part II, were probably of brief
duration and limited to a few specific industries and regions.
76 For a thorough discussion of this phenomenon, consult Rawski
(1984) or Brandt and Sargent (1987).
77 Brandt (1985) documents the validity of the "law of one price" for
many agricultural commodities.
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B. Evaluation of Brandt & Sargent's Interpretation
Brandt and Sargent explain the outflow of silver from China as a
windfall gain permitted by an increase in the world price of silver.
Since China's price level obeyed the laws of international commodity
arbitrage, a higher world price of silver simultaneously caused an
appreciation of the Chinese currency and a fall in the Chinese price
level. As prices fell, a lower silver stock could support an unchanged
quantity of real "outside money," the reduction in silver stock
constituting the one-time gain.7 8 In the words of Brandt and Sargent:
"The resulting temporary balance of payments deficit would be
China's reward, a temporary dividend of additional resources
either to consume or invest. [in footnote:] China's
merchandise was in deficit every year after 1876. Prior to
the 1930's, this deficit and treasury import were financed by
overseas remittances and net foreign investment in China.
Between 1933 and 1936 export of silver was the primary
balancing item."
In brief, this silver export permitted a continued trade deficit despite
a sharp fall in emigrants' remittances and foreign investment in China.
78 Myers ("The World Depression and the Chinese Economy, 1930-36,"
p. 28.) expresses this same idea, but with a slight technical error:
"Because silver had appreciated, less silver could support the same volume
of deposits and notes." This would not hold within China, where both
assets (silver) and liabilities (deposits and notes) were denominated in
the same numeraire, silver dollars. An appreciation of that numeraire
relative to real goods and foreign currencies will not permit decreased
assets to support the same liabilities.
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The highlights of Brandt and Sargent's argument can be summarized
as:
(1) An exogenous rise in the world price of silver
caused the Chinese price level to fall, as determined by
international commodity arbitrage.
(2) The fall in the Chinese price level resulted in a
rise in the real value of "outside money" (or monetary
silver), implying that China received a windfall gain. China
could export silver (in exchange for goods) with no change in
the real supply of outside money.
(3) Silver export in fact replaced overseas remittances
and foreign investment in financing China's ongoing trade
deficit. The windfall gain, in other words, permitted China
to maintain a trade deficit despite a decline in overseas
remittances and foreign investment.
(4) By international commodity arbitrage, there should
have been no change in the Chinese real exchange rate; i.e.
price movements should precisly have offset nominal exchange
rate movements.
(5) A vertical Phillips curve, resulting from complete
flexibility of factor markets, ensured that China would suffer
no output loss from the nominal deflation.
While this depiction does capture certain key features of China's
balance-of-payments account, it fails to explain the sudden increase in
silver exports occurring in 1934 and 1935. The features of Brandt and
Sargent's position outlined above will be discussed below.
(1) The rapid fall in the Chinese prices for many internationally
traded commodities confirms that, although trade represented only a small
part of China's total economy, Chinese markets were well integrated into
world markets.79
(2) According to the model of free banking under a commodity
standard used by Brandt and Sargent to describe China's economy, a rise
in the world price of silver should induce an export of silver that leaves
unchanged the real stock of "outside money," or silver money. The fall
79 Again, Brandt (1985) successfully demonstrates this integration.
74
in China's price level should be automatically accompanied by a decrease
in monetary silver. As the chart below indicates, the real supply of
monetary silver did not remain constant, but grew in 1932 and 1933, then
shrank in 1934 and 1935.
YEARS CHANGE IN PRICE LEVEL80 CHANGE IN SILVER8 1
1931-32 -11.3 % + 1.0 %
1932-33 - 7.7 % - 0.6 %
1933-34 - 6.5 % - 12.3 %
1934-35 - 1.0 % - 14.6 %
Most important, the timing of the Chinese deflation does not
correspond to the pattern of Chinese silver exports. The outflow of
silver from China increased by a factor of twenty in 1934 to about C$ 280
million, a level that was sustained in 1935 as well. Yet, Chinese
deflation decelerated in 1934 and practically disappeared by 1935. In
1932 and 1933, when prices were declining (and thus the real value of
silver rising) more rapidly, actual silver outflows were only C$ 10
million and C$ 14 million respectively.
(3) The table below indicates that emigrants' remittances and
foreign investments both fell markedly in the early 1930's, but a few
years before the rapid exodus of Chinese silver.
YEAR OVERSEAS FOREIGN REMITTANCES & SILVER
REMITTANCES INVESTMENT FOREIGN INV. OUTFLOW
1930 316 202 518 -101
1931 360 44 404 -70
1932 327 60 387 10
1933 300 30 330 14
80 Calculated from the National Tariff Commission's wholesale price
index for Shanghai.
81 Total monetary silver estimated by Rawski (1984).
75
1934 250 70 320 280
1935 260 o82 260 289
The sum of overseas remittances plus foreign investments and loans
fell steadily from 1931 through 1935, the largest decline, amounting to
CS$ 115 million, occurring in 1931. In other years, the decrease in these
inflows was much less dramatic: C$ 17 million 1931-1932, C$ 57 million
1932-1933, C$ 10 million 1933-1934, and C$ 60 million 1934-1935.
Moreover, while overseas remittances and foreign investment did decline,
less external financing was necessary in 1934 and 1935 as China's current
account deficit narrowed. In fact, the current account deficit decreased
by far more than did capital inflows (excluding sales of precious metals).
Therefore, one should expect a decrease in China's exports of silver and
gold, not the sharp increase that in fact occurred.
(4) The observed real appreciation, as discussed in Part II,
Section 1, does not directly contradict Brandt and Sargent's claim, since
wholesale price indices typically include some non-tradables, for which
international commodity arbitrage would not hold. Although other factors
also helped to determine the demand for China's exports, especially the
level of world activity, to dismiss entirely the effect of exchange rate
changes may be inappropriate.
(5) As discussed in Part II, the actual loss in output suffered by
China was, contrary to most accounts of the period, brief and confined to
specific sectors. Nonetheless, there exists sufficient evidence of
82 The zero foreign investment level reported for 1935 may simply
reflect a lack of data. In any case, by far the largest decline in
foreign investment occurred between 1930 and 1931.
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nominal rigidities in debts, rents, taxes, and some wages that a truly
vertical Phillips curve may be too strong an assertion.
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C. A New Interpretation of China's Silver Outflows
Brandt and Sargent's interpretation successfully incorporates two
new findings concerning China's silver episode: the rise in the total
(inside plus outside) money supply, and the absence of a marked decline
in output, both of which are inconsistent with Friedman and Schwartz's
account. Neither of these explanations, however, convincingly explains
the rapid outflow of silver from China taking place in 1934 and 1935.
Friedman and Schwartz emphasize the trade deficit, which actually narrowed
in these years. Brandt and Sargent focus on overall deflation, which
again had considerably decelerated in 1934 and 1935.
An important entry in the balance-of-payments statistics entitled
"Flight or Transfer of Capital," registers a sudden increase from a
negligeable level through 1933 to C$ 200 million in 1934 and C$ 250
million in 1935. This entry alone can explain the dramatic increase in
silver outflows, which showed no corresponding deficit in the current
account. A widening trade deficit would have been consistent with either
Friedman and Schwartz or Brandt and Sargent's interpretations. For
Friedman and Schwartz, a larger trade gap would be the inevitable
consequence of substitution effects associated with a real appreciation.
For Brandt and Sargent, an increased trade deficit would represent the
capital gain, or "China's reward, a temporary dividend of additional
resources either to consume or invest."
In fact, China acquired not goods, but net claims abroad.
Foreigners holding funds within China, primarily in foreign banks,
transferred this capital overseas, presumably into foreign exchange. This
transaction, which took place mainly before the imposition of capital
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controls in October 1934, lowered foreign claims on China. Later,
speculators smuggled silver abroad in exchange for foreign currency (or
silver holdings outside China, for those anticipating a further increase
in the world price of silver). If the purpose of silver export had been
simply an increase in consumption, it would have been far more attractive
to export gold, which was far less costly to smuggle per unit value, as
the Chinese had done in years past. In brief, the purpose of silver
export was to transfer capital outside of China before the currency, paper
or silver, was further devalued via a suspension of convertibility or a
total embargo on silver.
Factors other than the possibility of a departure from silver may
also have contributed to the flight of capital in 1934 and 1935, but data
suggest that these were not of great practical importance. In particular,
after the Japanese had seized Manchuria, one of China's most productive
regions, in early 1932, the threat of further aggression by Japan
undoubtedly generated some political uncertainty in China. In fact, five
years later, in the summer of 1937, Japan indeed attacked North China and
Shanghai, marking the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War. The conflict
with Japan in 1937 created sufficient financial instability that in August
the Chinese government was forced to impose severe limits on cash
withdrawals; remaining balances could be transferred between bank accounts
but were not convertible to cash or foreign exchange.
Prior to 1937, however, little speculative activity can be
attributed to the Japanese threat. The Japanese occupation of Manchuria
had been completed by md-1932, but only C$ 10 million in silver left
China in 1932, followed by C$ 14 million in 1933. The true flight of
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capital, in which hundreds of millions of Chinese dollars of silver left
China, occurred in 1934 and 1935 as the world price of silver rose sharply
and the Chinese government gradually dismantled the silver standard.
After the currency reform of 3 November 1935, the worst had already
happened and the smuggling of silver fell to a mere C$ 40 million in
1936.83 Divorced from silver but freely convertible, the Chinese dollar
maintained a stable exchange rate (against the U.S. dollar) throughout
1936 and most of 1937. Capital controls were not imposed until August
1937 and the Chinese dollar did not actually depreciate until 1938.
83 League of Nations, Balance-of-Payments Statistics, 1937.
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IV. CONC LUSION
What lessons can be drawn from this analysis of China's departure
from the silver standard? Clearly, the Chinese government faced an
extremely difficult situation as the world price of silver began to
increase at an unprecedented rate. The large circulation of silver coins
made simple devaluation within a silver standard virtually impossible.
Meanwhile, a complete separation from silver would have required
abandoning a centuries-long tradition and the very basis of the Chinese
monetary system.
Two historical comparisons suggest alternative solutions to China's
gradual dissolution of the silver standard. At one extreme, China could
have emulated Hong Kong, and simply have ignored the rapid increase in
silver prices, the domestic deflation, and any outflow of silver, provided
that banks maintained sufficient silver stocks to back note issues. Hong
Kong maintained the silver standard without restriction through December
1935. As expected, the Hong Kong dollar appreciated in line with silver,
prices fell sharply, and some silver left Hong Kong. Yet, a panicked
redemption of notes for silver never occurred, presumably because it was
clearly understood that Hong Kong was committed to the silver standard.
The case of Mexico represents the other extreme. Mexico maintained
a fixed exchange rate with the U.S. dollar, but when the price of silver
reached a sufficiently high level in April 1935, the silver in the peso
coin, which circulated widely, became worth more than the currency itself.
Mexico had two choices: allow the peso to appreciate or withdraw the
silver peso coins entirely. Mexico chose the latter, and acted swiftly,
declaring an emergency bank holiday then immediately nationalizing all
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silver coins.
The Mexican experience received considerable attention in China.
The Mexican reform was announced on 26 April 1935 and on 28 April 1935
(one day later, allowing for the time change), the headline of the North
China Daily News, an English daily non-financial paper, read "Mexico Makes
Sweeping Monetary Changes." Mexico's nationalization of silver coins is
likely to have increased Chinese nervousness and induced greater
smuggling.
Either of these alternatives would have been superior to the outcome
that resulted from China's incremental departure from silver. Had the
Chinese government realized that the true economic costs of the currency
appreciation and price deflation were extremely low, simple adherence to
the silver standard might have proved superior. It would at least have
permitted the government to focus its attention on matters of greater real
consequence. Had the government perceived a departure from the silver
standard as imminent, or even probable, an abrupt transition would have
enabled the government to take control of a greater quantity of silver,
and would have prevented the dissipation of real resources expended in
smuggling the silver abroad.
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Appendix A: The Chinese Economy and Financial System in the Interwar
Period
The Chinese Macroeconomy
The Chinese economy in the late 1920's and early 1930's was
primarily agricultural and relatively small on a global scale.
Estimates for 1933 indicate that agriculture, consisting largely of food
crops, represented about two-thirds of China's national income and about
three-quarters of the employment of China's population of 500 million.8 4
The non-agricultural sector was dominated by the handicraft industry,
but also included some activity in trade and transportation. Exports,
consisting mainly of raw silk, yellow beans, eggs and egg products,
bean-cake, and other agricultural products were equal to about 2-4% of
China's GDP.85 Imports, composed primarily of cotton piece goods, raw
cotton, rice, sugar, and metals, amounted to about 4-7% of China's GDP
in the 1930-33 period. 8 6
The Chinese Monetary System
China's monetary system in the late 1920's and early 1930's was
extremely complex and decentralized. In various parts of the country
there circulated silver coins, copper coins, and bank notes issued by
"native" banks, government banks, or private commercial banks. Copper
84 Feuerwerker, The Chinese Economy. 1912-1949, p. 7, 9, 25.
85 Bank of China, Statistics of China's Foreign Trade. 1930-1933,
p. 24.
86 Ibid, p. 25.
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coins were used mainly in small personal transactions, whereas silver
was the primary medium of exchange for larger commercial transactions.
Usually, one type of currency could be used only within a given region
though currencies of other regions were recognized. There flourished a
multitude of money-changing houses whose exchange rates fluctuated
frequently.8 7
Silver was the primary currency used in international transactions,
China having first acquired large quantities of the metal in the early
18th century in exchange for silk and tea exports to the West. Over the
years, silver grew in importance for domestic transactions as well, and
by 1857, a national standard of silver currency, the Shanghai tael, was
established. The tael was worth roughly one ounce of silver, but
typically took the form of 50-tael "shoes" of silver weighing about four
pounds and used in bank transactions. In 1933, the tael was abolished
and replaced by the standard (Chinese) silver dollar, worth about 0.8166
ounces. Until 1933, the silver coins that circulated within China were
primarily foreign coins or various provincial issues. The Shanghai
mint, established in 1933, issued about C 133,000,000 in coins and
bars from March 1933 through June 1935. Actual silver coinage in
circulation was estimated to represent 68% of total currency in 1930 and
45% in 1935.88
Silver dollar bank notes in circulation were issued primarily by
the Bank of China, the Bank of Communications, and the Central Bank of
87 For a detailed description, consult Tamagna, Banking and
Finance in China, pp. 57-196.
88 Young, China's Nation-Building Effort, p. 268.
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China, but other Chinese and foreign banks issued some banknotes as
well. Before 1931, no specific regulations governed the quantity of
notes a bank could issue, but notes of the major Shanghai banks
ordinarily traded at par. On 28 February 1931, a banking law was passed
requiring note-issuing banks to hold reserves of 60% silver and 40%
negotiable (usually government) bonds in against notes in circulation.
The Chinese Banking System
The Chinese banking system before the 1935 currency reform was
comprised of three types of banks: "native" banks, foreign banks, and
modern banks. Native banks were private, small, sometimes family-owned
financial institutions that received deposits and granted loans to local
residents, often based on personal acquaintance rather than on secured
collateral.
Foreign banks operated primarily out of Shanghai and focused on the
financing of international trade. They were especially active in
foreign exchange transactions. Although foreign banks did issue some
bank notes, much of the silver in foreign banks was held not to back
issues of bank notes, but to ship abroad in exchange for foreign
currency or China's imports.8 9
89 As Sir Arthur Salter observed: "Silver transferred to the
foreign banks is immediately convertible into foreign exchange....silver
transferred to the foreign banks [for payment for imports] foreshadows
actual export overseas and is, in all its practical economic and
financial effects, already an export." (China and Silver, 1934, pp.22-
23)
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Finally, the "modern" Chinese banks, most of which were based in
Shanghai, provided financial services to Chinese industry. Included in
this group were the government banks that issued most of the country's
bank notes, and other non-government commercial banks. In the early
1930's, modern banks were growing in both number and capacity, as
branches throughout the country opened up and both governments and other
banks began to use the services of the modern banks rather than relying
upon foreign banks.
In terms of relative importance in 1935, the main modern banks had
total paid-up capital of about C$ 261 million, compared with about C$
100 million for the nation's native banks. Of the foreign banks, only
the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation conducted its primary
business in China, but this bank alone had paid-up capital of some C$
200 million. The other foreign banks performed only a small share of
the business in China.9 0
Silver in China
Chira's silver stocks in 1933, before the massive outflow of 1934-
1935, were estimated at 2.5 billion ounces, or 22% of the world's
visible stock of 11.54 billion ounces.91 About 1.7 billion ounces of
80 League of Nations, Commercial Banks, 1936.
91 China's stock of silver increased sharply from 1918 through
1931, when China had a trade deficit but overall balance-of-payments
surplus, largely because of remittances from Chinese overseas, foreign
investment in China, and minor items such as foreign military and
private expenditure in China. This balance-of-payments surplus
accumulated in the form of imported silver. (Leavens, Silver Money, pp.
87-91)
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China's silver took the form of monetary silver, representing about one-
third the world's monetary silver. As shown below, China ranked second
worldwide in terms of total silver holdings.92
Silver Stocks on January 1, 1933 (billions of ounces)
Rank/CountryI Total Silver I Monetary I Nonmonetary
1. India 4.35 I 1.05 1 3.3
2. China 2.5 I 1.7 I .8
3. USA I 1.64 I .64 I 1.0
On international markets, the exchPnge rate of the Shanghai tael,
and later the Chinese dollar, moved in parallel with the price of
silver, never varying by more than the costs of melting, shipping, and
interest. Despite considerable fluctuations in the nominal price of
silver---an increase of 32% in 1916 and a decrease of 40% in 1921----
deviations of the Chinese currency from parity stayed almost entirely
within the bounds of silver's import and export points.9 3
As of 1930, when French Indo-China left the silver standard, China
(including politically separate but economically dependent Hong Kong)
was the only major country in the world on a true silver standard.
Many American silver supporters claimed that India, Mexico, and a number
of other Latin American countries followed a silver standard as well,
but they failed to distinguish an abundance of silver coinage from an
actual silver standard. Although a large fraction of India's currency
92 Leavens, "The Distribution of the World's Silver," Review of
Economic Statistics, vol. 17, Nov.1935, pp.131-138.
93 Dickson H. Leavens, "The Ratio Between the T.T. Rate and the
Silver Price," 1928, studies this relationship on a monthly basis from
1909 to 1927. The fluctuations in the silver price are based on the
average nominal price in sterling.
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consisted of silver rupee coins, India was actually on the gold
standard, the rupee's value tied directly to the British pound.
Similarly, in Mexico, which had been on the gold standard since 1905,
a large number of silver peso coins circulated, but the peso was linked
not to silver but to the U.S. dollar at the rate of 3.60 pesos per
dollar.
Since neither of these currencies followed a silver standard, a
rise in silver would not automatically cause an appreciation of the
Indian rupee or the Mexican peso. Nonetheless, if the dollar price of
silver were to rise sufficiently and exchange rates remained unchanged,
it is clear that at some point Mexican and Indian silver coins could
become more valuable as silver than as currency. It would then become
profitable to redeem notes for silver coins to melt down for their
silver content. To prevent widespread melting of coins, the country
would be forced to revalue its currency upward in terms of foreign
currencies, to withdraw silver coins from circulation, or to prohibit
the export of silver derived from coins.
Two historical episodes regarding silver coinage may be worth
recounting for comparison with the Chinese experience in 1934 and 1935.
When a rapid increase in silver prices threatened the rupee coin in
1917-1920, India decided to allow the rupee to appreciate against the
pound. Since commodity prices overall were rising during this period,
this appreciation did not generate a deflation. Later, as the price of
silver and other commodities fell, the rupee depreciated accordingly.
Mexico, on the other hand, immediately nationalized all silver coins and
prohibited the export of silver coin iL: April 1935, as soon as the value
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of the silver in the Mexican peso first exceeded its monetary value.
Buoyed by the price of silver, the peso had ust begun to appreciate
from its stable rate of 3.60 to the dollar. The elimination of the
silver coin permitted Mexico to maintain the exchange rate of 3.60 pesos
per dollar, and avoid widespread deflation.
91.
Silver Flows and China's Balance-of-Payments
Since 1876, China had consistently registered a trade deficit,
which was partially offset by invisible items (such as remittances from
overseas Chinese) on the current account and by foreign investment and
loans on the capital account. In fact, from 1918 to 1931 China's
combined current and capital account showed sufficient surplus to permit
China to have annual net imports of precious metals. During this
period, China every year recorded net imports of silver, accompanied by
either an import of gold as well, or an export of gold of lesser
value .94
When the balance-of-payments grew less favorable beginning in
1931,95 China became a net exporter of precious metals, as shown in the
chart below. 96
94 Gold was regularly smuggled into China by returning emigrants,
explaining the China's ability to export gold despite the much lower
level of recorded imports. Although there was officially an embargo on
gold as of 15 May 1930, the metal was routinely smuggled out, and after
March 1931, the Central Bank could legally export gold with special
permission.(Leavens, Silver Money, p 29)
95 According to estimates in Lin, The New Monetary System of
China, p. 26. Official records indicate a smaller increase in gold
exports in 1931.
96 These numbers are derived from Lin, The New Monetary System of
China, p. 26.
92
YEAR CURRENT+ GOLD SILVER TOTAL GOLD+
CAPITAL EXPORT EXPORT SILVER EXPORT
ACCOUNT
1930 -103 47 -101 -54
1931 -167 212 - 70 142
1932 -266 205 10 215
1933 -386 189 14 203
1934 -197 112 280 392
1935 -110 68 289 357
All numbers in millions of Chinese dollars.
In 1932 and 1933, China exported far more gold (in value) than silver.
In 1934, China suddenly substituted silver exports for gold exports;
gold exports dropped by 41% while silver exports increased by 1900%!
It is striking that total exports of precious metals in 1934 nearly
doubled even though the combined current and capital account deficit
(excluding capital flight) shrunk by about one-half. These behavioral
shifts suggest that, although silver movements depended on China's
balance-of-payments, factors other than the balance-of-payments were the
important determinants of China's silver flows in 1934 and 1935. A more
detailed breakdown of China's balance-of-payments statistics from 1928
93
to 1935 are displayed in Table 6.97
China and the Depression, 1929-31
In the early years of the Depression, China was spared the severe
declines in output and prices that were occurring in the United States
and most European nation. Like other commodity prices, the price of
silver in terms of dollars or sterling fell sharply beginning in 1929.
With silver fell the exchange rate of the Chinese dollar. Most
commodity prices in terms of Chinese currency rose between 1930 and
1931, with the result that China underwent a slight inflation rather
than a major deflation. The fall in silver (and thus the Chinese
dollar) was greater than the combined fall in foreign prices and rise
in Chinese prices. Thus, China experienced a real depreciation,
creating a stimulus to exports that partly offset the fall in activity
in most of the countries to which China exported.
97 Official records of China's foreign trade fail to include
smuggled imports and exports, and thus are generally recognized to
understate the true extent of China's international commerce.
"Corrected" estimates are available, but the method of correction, i.e.
inflating recorded flows by a reasonable figure that changes year to
year, seems highly subjective. Furthermore, many of the entries in the
invisible account and capital account are only approximations rather
than direct observations. Finally, the estimates used in this table and
referred to later in this paper are, unfortunately, derived from four
different sources, since no single source estimates the entire period.
The official and "corrected" trade figures show the same general
tendencies, the two sets of data differing only in degree. Despite
their crudeness, these approximate figures justify a re-evaluation of
the Friedman and Schwartz as well as the Brandt and Sargent explanations
of China's silver crisis. Figures presented here were originally
assembled in Lin, The New Monetary System of China, p. 26.
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From 1929 to 1931, silver (and therefore the Chinese dollar) fell
by 48% against the U.S. dollar, and 41% against the pound. During this
period, American prices fell by 23%, British prices by 30%, implying
that the real value of silver fell considerably in these countries.
Nominal Chinese export prices increased ust 2.2% during this period.
This real depreciation resulted in increased competitiveness for Chinese
exports. Chinese exports, measured in local currency, show very little
decline in 1930 and 1931 despite the 25% fall in world industrial
activity from 1929 to 1931. Perhaps more important, the overall Chinese
price level rose, permitting China to avoid the real costs of deflation
experienced elsewhere.
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Appendix B: U.S. Silver Policy. 1933-35
Even before the U.S. Silver Purchase Act was passed on 19 June
1934, there existed considerable pressure in the U.S. to "do something
for silver." The price of silver had fallen by nearly half in the first
two years of the Depression, and silver producers, speculators, and
politicians representing silver-producing areas such as Nevada and Utah
urged for an increase in the price of silver as a means of expanding the
U.S. monetary base and reflating the economy. It was further argued
that raising the price of silver would increase the purchasing power of
silver-holding nations such as China and India, thereby stimulating U.S.
exports. In 1930, there was already talk of introducing a tariff on
silver to check foreign supplies entering the Uited States, and in
1931, the U.S. Congress pointed out the need for an international
conference on silver. In 1931 and 1932, there had been numerous failed
bills in Congress calling for large Treasury purchases of silver.
In 1933, words began to materialize into action, and with each new
victory for silver supporters, it became increasingly clear that the
price of silver could soon reach new highs. The "Thomas Amendment" of
12 May 1933 permitted the President to fix the price ratio of gold to
silver at any level, guaranteed that silver be considered as legal
tender, and authorized the U.S. government to accept silver at fifty
cents an ounce, about twice the existing price, as debt repayment from
foreign governments. Only a few foreign nations actually made use of
this proviso, making silver payments of about $11 million, far less than
the $200 million the U.S. was authorized to accept. Following the World
Monetary and Economic Conference in London in June-July 1933, large
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silver holders (China, India, and Spain) and large silver producers
(Australia, Canada, Mexico, Peru, and the United States) agreed not to
depress the world silver market with excess supply.98 On 21 December
1933, Roosevelt ordered the U.S. mint to pay half the monetary value of
$ 1.29 per ounce, or 64 cents per ounce, for silver mined in the United
States; the market price at the time was some forty cents per ounce.
In early 1934, there was considerable activity in both Congress and
the Administratic- conerning silver. Some spoke of a bimetallic
standard, others of increasing silver holdings. On 19 June 1934, silver
supporters gained their greatest victory: the Silver Purchase Act.
This act resolved that thp U.S. Treasury should increase its silver
holdings with the ultimate objective of raising the proportion of silver
reserves to one quarter the combined value of its gold and silver
reserves. At the time, siiver constituted Just over 10% of total silver
and gold reserves. The Treasury was authorized to spend up to $1.29
per ounce, silver's monetary value, on international markets but no more
than 50 cents per ounce domestically.
To prevent speculators from making windfall profits, the government
imposed a 50% tax on profit derived from silver sales after 15 May 1934.
As a further step, on 9 August 1934, the government "nationalized"
silver, requiring that all silver already situated with the United
States be delivered to the U.S. mint within ninety days, at a price of
98 Specifically, for the period 1934-37, India agreed not to sell
more than 35 million ounces per year; China, none at all. The producing
nations agreed to purchase or absorb in total at least 35 million ounces
per year of domestically produced silver. Of this 35 million, the U.S.
was responsible for acquiring 24 million, Mexico 7 million.
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50.01 cents per ounce. Ironically, the speculators, among those who had
pushed hardest for higher silver prices, were deprived of the benefits
just as silver prices showed their greatest prospects of increasing.
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Table 1
Nominal and Real Price of Silver (in US Dollars)
1910-1935
PRICE
LEVEL
USA
(1930-100)
(A)
81.4
75.1
80.0
80.7
78.7
80.5
98.9
135.9
152.0
160.3
178.7
113.0
111.9
116.4
113.5
119.7
115.7
110.5
112.1
110.1
100.0
84.3
75.3
76.2
86.5
92.6
PRICE
SILVER
USA
(cents/oz)
(B)
54
53
61
60
56
51
67
84
98
112
102
63
68
65
67
69
62
56
58
53
38
29
28
35
48
64
REAL PRICE
SILVER
USA
(1930-100)
(B)/(A)
174.6
185.7
200.7
195.7
187.3
166.7
178.3
162.7
169.7
183.9
150.2
146.7
159.9
147.0
155.3
151.7
141.0
133.4
136.2
126.7
100.0
90.5
97.9
120.9
146.0
181.9
Sources: (A) Bratter, Silver Market Dictionary
(B) Silver and Prices in China
YEAR
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
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Table 2
Exchange Rate of Chinese Dollar, 1914-1935
YEAR EXCHANGE
RATE
STERLING
(pence per C$)
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
21.3
20.3
24.9
41.0
41.0
49.4
53.0
30.8
29.3
27.1
28.6
27.3
25.6
22.0
22.7
20.5
14.8
12.0
14.8
14.8
16.1
17.8
EXCHANGE
RATE
DOLLAR
(cents per C$)
44
40
51
82
67
82
90
81
49
54
52
53
55
50
45
46
42
30
22
21
26
34
Sources: Silver and Prices in China, p. 7
and Shen, China's Currency Reform, p. 176.
Table 3
World Price Indices, 1927-1935
CHINESE
WHOLESALE
PRICES
(NatlTrfCom)
(1929-100)
99.9
97.3
100.0
109.9
121.2
107.6
99.3
92.9
92.0
USA
WHOLESALE
PRICES
(1929-100)
100.1
101.5
100.0
90.7
76.6
68.0
69.3
78.7
83.9
UK
WHOLESALE
PRICES
(Economist)
(1929-100)
108.2
106.2
100.0
84.0
70.2
67.7
68.2
71.0
74.1
Source: League of Nations, World Production and Prices,
various issues.
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1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
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Table 4
CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE (including Manchuria until 1932)
OFFICIAL FIGURES
YEAR OFFICIAL
EXPORTS
(NOMINAL)
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1545
1582
1394
1417
768
612
535
76
OFFICIAL
IMPORTS
(NOMINAL)
1863
1972
2041
2233
1635
1346
1030
919
OFFICIAL
TRADE
BALANCE
(NOMINAL)
-318
-390
-647
-816
-867
-734
-495
-343
WHOLESALE
PRICE
INDEX
(1926-100)
101.7
104.5
114.8
126.7
112.4
103.8
97.1
96.1
CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE (including Manchuria
CORRECTED FIGURES
until 1932)
YEAR CORRECTED
EXPORTS
(NOMINAL)
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1561
1648
1477
1687
922
673
616
662
CORRECTED
IMPORTS
(NOMINAL)
1794
1899
1965
2271
1668
1480
1184
1129
CORRECTED
TRADE
BALANCE
(NOMINAL)
-233
-251
-488
-584
-746
-807
-569
-467
WHOLESALE
PRICE
INDEX
(1926-100)
101.7
104.5
114.8
126.7
112.4
103.8
97.1
96.1
CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE (excluding Manchuria)
OFFICIAL FIGURES
YEAR
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
EXPORTS
(NOMINAL)
1047
1070
944
915
569
612
535
576
IMPORTS
(NOMINAL)
1530
1620
1723
2002
1524
1345
1030
919
TRADE
BALANCE
(NOMINAL)
-483
-550
-779
-1087
-955
-733
-495
-343
TRADE
BALANCE
(REAL)
-475
-526
-679
-858
-850
-706
-510
-357
(All figures in millions of Chinese dollars)
Sources: Central Bank of China Bulletin (1936) (official figures).
Lin, The New Monetary System of China, p. 26 (corrected
figures).
OFFICIAL
TRADE
BALANCE
(REAL)
-313
-373
-564
-644
-771
-707
-510
357
CORRECTED
TRADE
BALANCE
(REAL)
-229
-240
-425
-461
-664
-778
-586
-486
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Table 6
CHINA'S MONETARY SILVER STOCKS
(millions of Chinese dollars)
AT END OF CHINESE FOREIGN ALL CHINESE FOREIGN
BANKS BANKS BANKS BANKS BANKS
Shanghai Shanghai Shanghai Tientsin Tientsin
DEC 31 179.3 86.9 266.2
DEC 32 253.3 185.0 438.3
DEC 33 271.8 275.7 547.5 54.3 51.0
JUL 34 330.6 232.2 562.8
DEC 34 280.3 54.7 335.0 34.0 9.5
MAY 35 290.2 50.8 341.0
SEP 35 293.4 42.7 336.1
06 NOV 35 272.4 42.9 315.3 32.0 9.4
Sources: League of Nations, Commercial Banks (1935), p. 53.
Tamagna, Banking and Finance in China, p. 104.
Lin, New Monetary System of China, p. 55
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Table 7
NATIONAL REGULATIONS
4/34 Coastwise shipment of silver in any form suitable for minting
allowed only with permit issued by Ministry of Finance.
(#1359)
9/8/34 Ministry of Finance limited foreign exchange transactions to
legitimate business purposes.
10/15/34 Export tax on silver raised to 10% and variable equalization
charge is imposed. (#1389)
10/31/34 Individuals travelling abroad may carry a maximum of C$ 50 in
silver. (#1396)
11/21/34 License required for coastal shipments of silver. Only banks
allowed to ship silver. (#1402)
11/27/34 Amount of silver individuals may carry to Manchuria limited
to C$ 50. Shipment of silver to Manchuria by land or sea
prohibited. (#1404)
12/4/34 Customs authorized to confiscate any silver shipped abroad or
travelling within China without a necessary permit.
12/34 Ministry of Finance instructs Central Mint that regulations
governing coinage of standard silver dollars must be strictly
enforced. (If bar silver supplied by merchants is too impure,
a 1.5% refining fee will be imposed.)
12/17/34 Maximum C$ 50 of silver may be transported from one treaty-
port to another. Passengers travelling within China permitted
to carry up to C$ 1000. (#1413)
1/14/35 Ban on silver transport either abroad or to regions where
silver dollars were not in standard use. (#1422)
1/29/35 Substantial rewards offered for informants on smuggling
(#1426).
3/27/35 Imported silver can be registered, then re-exported without
charges. (#1440)
6/15/35 Hong Kong prohibited export of silver bars made in China.
6/17/35 Explicit permission required to carry silver within China.
Violation will be interpreted as smuggling.
7/8/35 Fines for smuggling set at five times the value of silver
smuggled. Smuggling of silver punishable by death. (#1454)
7/15/35 All sea-going junks restricted to maximum of C$ 100 per junk
unless special permit is obtained. (#1455)
Source: China Monthly Trade Report, Shanghai, various issues.
(Customs Notification numbers in parentheses.)
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Table 8
REGIONAL REGULATIONS
10/1928 Peiping city government required special pass for export of
silver greater than C$ 300.
4/26/33 Embargo on export of silver from Guangdong province: No one
is allowed to take more than C$ 20 when leaving the province
and export of bar silver is entirely prohibited. Smugglers
detected lose all silver and are severely punished.
Corruption of inspectors punishable by death. (Amendment
5/27/33: 80% of confiscated silver may be kept by
inspectors.)
10/1933 Kansu provincial government prohibits export of silver.
12/4/33 Kwangsi provincial government limited individuals leaving
province to C$ 20 in silver coins. Steamships limited to C$
200 in silver, sailing vessels to C$ 100.
193 Shensi government prohibited silver transport out of counties
along provincial boundaries. Amount of silver carried can
never exceed C$ 100. Fines for smuggling increase with
quantity smuggled: 1-5% for CS$ 100-10000, 5-10% for C$ 10000-
30000, and 10% for over CS$ 30000.
3/10/34 Hunan province requires permit for silver transfer out of
province greater than C$ 500. Fine for smuggled silver set
at 5%, of which 1% may be kept by inspectors as finders'
reward.
11/14/34 Embargo from Guangdong province (capital Canton). Individuals
may carry maximum of CS$ 20 when leaving province. Export of
bullion entirely prohibited.
12/1934 Hunan province reduces silver carrying allowance for any
person leaving the province from CS$ 500 tolCO7700. adrg
province forbids individuals to leave province with more than
CS$ 20 in silver. Banks wishing to ship silver out of province
must obtain a special permit. Within province, transfers
across districts limited to CS$ 300.
1/16/35 Wuhu customs restrict silver export from Wuhu port to CS$ 1000
per person.
Source: China Monthly Trade Report, Shanghai, various issues.
Chinese Economic Journal, Shanghai, various issues.
EFFECTS OF REGULATION
10/34
11/34
3/35
4/35
5/35
early 6/35
6/35
7/35
7/24/35
8/35
9/35
Tientsin: Runs on some of the larger banks met without
difficulty.
Tsingtao: Run on local branch of National Industrial Bank.
Peiping: Some banks not converting notes into silver.
Canton: Silver being exported in small lots, though a seizure
of C$ 100,000 and one of C 10,000 were made.
Shanghai: Coins circulated freely at par.
Shanghai: Coins continue to circulate freely.
Tientsin: Small premium being paid for silver. Estimated
smuggling in Northeast of C$ 20,000 to 30,00 per day. Local
banks agreed not to export silver.
Amoy: Silver at 20% premium over bank notes.
Canton: 27% premium of silver dollars over notes.
Silver shortages at Peiping, Amoy, Tientsin, Canton.
Tientsin: "Chinese government agents were stationed at local
Chinese banks to question suspicious characters who wished to
convert banknotes into silver, especially those who required
amounts of more than C$ 100."
Hopei: Provincial government limited amount of silver
passengers could carry. Exchange shops paid a 3-4% premium
for coins over notes.
Native banks limited withdrawals to C$ 500/account
Redemption of notes suspended in North China.
Tientsin: 200 Koreans were forced to exchange their silver for
cash when suspected of smuggling.
Tientsin: silver can still be obtained on demand, but
individuals must furnish adequate reason to the government
before receiving coins.
Shanghai: banks refused to convert large amounts of notes.
Silver at a premium over notes in the interior.
Tientsin: One bank reported to redeem notes in Central
Banknotes rather than silver in order to avert run.
Shanghai: Finance and Commerce article "Disparity in Price
of Silver Between Different Cities in China" cites progressive
increase in value of coins as they leave Shanghai. Shanghai
to Hankow (+1%) to Hunan (+10%) to Guangdong (+20%) to abroad
(+5%).
Tientsin: Exchange shops in Japanese concession paid a
premium (8% in July, 10.5% in August, maximum in August 18%)
for coins over notes.
Tsingtao: Maximum redemption C$ 10 per person.
Tsingtao: Notes being taken to the interior to exchange for
silver, even at a premium.
Tientsin: Premium on silver dropped from 10% to 7.5%.
Source: China Monthly Trade Report, Shanghai, various issues.
Finance and Commerce, Shanghai, various issues.
Table 9
REGIONAL
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Table 10
MONTHLY NET EXPORTS OF SILVER (in Chinese dollars)
-1,783,036
1,566,950
-867,012
14,763,690
2,147,418
12,936,427
24,308,009
79,094,748
48,139,773
56,332,138
11,327,650
11,974,659
-2,709,273
-550,034
-986,961
-2,429,919
1,043,022
-48,058
-98,506
-229,193
-736,761
-55,480
-110,816
66,542,608
TOTAL 1934: 256,728,000
TOTAL JAN-NOV 1935: -7,146,000
Source: Central Bank of China Bulletin, March 1936.
1934 Jai1
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
1935 Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
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Table 11
Notes in Circulation
Central Bank
Bank of of
China China
(A) (A)
Bank Farmers CENTRAL ALL
of Bank of BANKING MODERN
Communic.China GROUP BANKS
(A) (A) (A) (A)
0 306.8
2 339.9
5.6 408.8
29.8 469.1
29.8 676.7
516.8
613.9
747.7
200.8
192.9
197.1
1032.9 225.7
Source: (A) Tamagna, Banking and Finance in China, p. 139, 185.
(B) Rawski, Estimates of China's Money Supply, p. 22
END-1932
END-1933
END-1934
6 NOV 34
END-1935
40.0
71.1
86.0
131.8
179.9
184.4
183.7
204.7
185.5
286.2
FOREIGN
BANKS
(B)
82.4
83.1
112.5
122.0
180.8
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CHAPTER THREE
THE ROLE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT AND CURRENCY DEVALUATION
IN THE CURRENT COMMODITY SLUMP
112
I. INTRODUCTION*
Continued low commodity prices despite a recovery of global
industrial activity in 1984 and the decline of the dollar since 1985 have
begun to shift the focus of commodity price analysis from the demand side to
the supply side. It has been suggested that indebted developing countries may
be expanding exports in an attempt to obtain foreign exchange, thereby
shifting the supply curve outwards. A related but distinct explanation
asserts that debtor nations' foreign exchange requirements have caused the
"supply" curve to slope downward: a fall in the price of a key export will,
assuming the country's perceived elasticity of demand exceeds one, induce that
country to sell more of that export in order to meet its debt repayment
schedule. For stability, the supply curve must be steeper than the demand
curve.
Recent econometric estimates have provided some empirical support for
the importance of the supply-side. Gilbert (1986) reported that debt entered
significantly into a commodity price determination equation: higher debt-
servicing needs implied lower commodity prices, suggesting an outward shift of
the supply curve. There is also empirical support of the hypothesis of a
downward-sloping supply: the elasticity of dollar commodity prices with
respect to the dollar exchange rate was found to be -1.6 (Dornbusch, 1985).
In this model, where the world is divided into dollar and non-dollar regions,
a vertical or upward-sloping supply curve would produce a coefficient between
zero and minus one, depending on the market share and elasticities of dollar
and non-dollar demand and supply. The excessive sensitivity implied by an
* My thanks to Sompheap Sem for research assistance and to Jean Kesser for
typing services.
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elasticity of -1.6 is theoretically tenable if the supply curve slopes
downward.
This study distinguishes the various hypothesized relationships
between developing country debt and primary commodity prices in terms of their
implications for a change in the slope of the supply curve or a shift of the
supply curve and sets up specific tests of these relationships. The study
also examines the hypothesized relationships between real exchange rate
changes in the developing countries and international commodity prices.
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II. THE EFFECT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT
Earlier Empirical Findings
A negative correlation between developing countries' debt-servicing
levels and non-fuel primary commodity prices was established in an empirical
paper by Gilbert (1986). In this analysis, nominal dollar commodity prices
for all commodities, foods, agricultural non-foods, and for metals and
minerals were expressed as a function of: their own lags, the dollar exchange
rate, the nominal US interest rate, US wholesale prices, OECD industrial
production, the price of oil, and the ratio of developing countries' total
debt service to the commodity price index itself. Dividing debt-service
requirements by the price of commodities generates a proxy for the volume of
exports developing countries would need to sell to cover their debt payments.
Using a Sargan-Hendry general-to-simple methodology to refine the
specification, Gilbert determined that total debt service divided by the
commodity price, lagged four quarters, should enter as an explanatory variable
for quarterly changes in the commodity price. In his final three-stage least-
squares estimation, he found that debt service had a significant effect in
reducing commodity prices.
A number of economic interpretations were proposed in light of this
statistical finding. A "target revenue" explanation linked lower commodity
prices to increased commodity exports; reasoning that debtors, needing to
raise foreign exchange to make payments regardless of the terms-of-trade,
would actually expand exports in the face of lower prices. A "wealth effect"
theory emphasized that a fall in an export price would constitute a real
decline in wealth to a nation with nominal dollar debt. This in turn would
give rise to reduced consumption of goods as well as leisure, and again,
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increased exports. Finally, a "real depreciation" hypothesis attributed an
expansion of exports to a real depreciation or other policy reactions induced
by debt-servicing difficulties.
Although Gilbert's work adds an important new dimension to the study
of commodity prices, his analysis exhibits certain conceptual weaknesses. In
terms of specification, it is clearly incorrect to express the change in
commodity prices as a function of the level of debt-service divided by the
commodity price. If debt-servicing needs force a country to expand its
exports, a one-time fall in price corresponding to the one-time outward shift
in supply would be expected. High debt-servicing should imply low, not
falling commodity prices.
Furthermore, a satisfactory explanation is lacking for the four-
quarter lag employed in Gilbert's estimation; it seems either too long or too
short. A rise in debt-repayment needs may cause an immediate export response
in the form of de-stocking, causing a simultaneous decline in the commodity
price; in that case one would expect a zero or one-quarter lag. On the other
hand, an export response requiring long-run capital investment in the form of
mining plant or tree planting would imply possibly a lag of several years.
Outward Shift of Supply vs. Downward-Sloping Supply
The distinction between an outward shift of the supply curve and a
change in the slope of the supply curve requires greater clarification. Under
ordinary circumstances, debt-servicing obligations should not affect the
supply of commodities; transitory shocks in revenue can be absorbed through
short-term borrowing or lending. If, however, a country is incapable of
further borrowing, then a shock to the debt repayment schedule, such as a rise
in interest rates or a decline in lender confidence, may shift its export
supply schedule outwards. At all prices, exports increase.
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This outward shift may or may not be accompanied by a change in the
slope of supply. If just a few commodities represent a very high share of a
country's total exports, then a decline in price caused by a demand shock
could lead to an increase in the quantity supplied, intensifying the price
decline.
The economic importance of distinguishing the two supply effects is
clear. If supply has shifted outward, then assuming no shift in demand the
future course of prices will depend on the persistence of the supply shock.
Conversely, if supply has changed slope, then today's low prices must be
partly attributable to a demand shift. An analysis of price determinants
should also focus on the demand-side. If the demand shock is transitory,
prices should recover as soon as the shock disappears, and moreover, should
rise equally dramatically in the case of a positive demand shock. Overall, a
downward-sloping supply curve would imply greater price volatility for given
supply and demand shocks. If it is expected that commodity prices will
eventually be stimulated by an increase in demand, the slope of the supply
curve will indicate how great a demand shift will be needed to generate a
given price rise. A downward-sloping supply curve will clearly require less
demand stimulus than an upward-sloping curve.
The "target revenue" theory of the debt-commodity price relation
allows for both types of supply changes. An increase in the "target," i.e.
higher debt-service, will shift supply outward. If the commodity in question
is a primary means of attaining that "target," the supply curve may in
addition slope downward. The "wealth effect" explanation, as it relates to
changes in the commodity's price, emphasizes the downward slope in supply,
although total debt outstanding rather than a given year's debt-servicing
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should be the relevant variable. Of course, this explanation requires
countries to believe that price declines are permanent. The "real
depreciation" version of the debt-commodity price correlation is essentially a
story of outward shifts in supply corresponding to each devaluation. If,
however, real devaluations are directly responsive to the price of exports
rather than to general debt problems, then the "real depreciation" hypothesis
becomes a story of downward-sloping supply.
Evidence of an Outward Shift in Supply
The econometric specification of Gilbert (1986) is well-suited to
capture shifts in the supply curve but not to detect the possibility of a
downward-sloping supply. Any supply-induced intensification of a demand-based
price decline will not be statistically evident or at least will be very
difficult to detect in the presence of noise. 1/ Aside from the conceptual
inconsistency discussed above, i.e. attributing a falling price to a high
1/ Consider, for example, a constant profile of debt-service payments and a
demand-induced fall in the commodity price. The debt-service variable
enters on the right-hand side as the ratio of total debt-service to the
nominal commodity price index, lagged four periods. The logarithm of the
same commodity price index, in real terms, also enters with a four-period
lag. For the debt-service variable to exhibit the expected negative
coefficient, we would require: (1) that the level of commodity prices
four periods ago be -positively correlated with this period's change in
price; (2) that the debt-service expression (with a constant numerator and
the commodity price index in the denominator) be more closely correlated
with this period's price change than the real commodity price
expression. Thus, a supply side magnification of a demand side shock will
be practically impossible to detect econometrically, though a fall in
commodity prices caused by an increase in debt-service should be readily
captured by this specification.
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level of debt-service, Gilbert's results can be interpreted as evidence
suggestive of an outward shift in supply.
Further investigation reveals, however, that the significance of
debt-servicing in a commodity price determination equation is not at all
robust. Alternative specifications were tested on both quarterly and annual
data for the period 1961-1986, for the commodity price indices--all
commodities, food, beverages, agricultural raw materials and metals--on a
single-equation basis. These indices were deflated by US industrial goods
prices. Real commodity prices were regressed on the level of industrial
production in the industrial countries, the real dollar exchange rate
(represented as relative US wholesale prices, relative to other industrial
countries), developing country debt-servicing, a time trend and a constant.
In the quarterly regressions, a four-quarter distributed lag was generally
used on the right-hand side variables. Quarterly debt-servicing figures were
constructed as moving averages based on annual data centered at mid-year. All
regressions were performed in logs or first differences of logs, and were
corrected for AR1 errors.
In a regression of the level of commodity prices, debt-servicing in
the preceding four quarters did in many cases enter significantly but
inevitably coefficients on the distributed lag contained both positive and
negative terms. The sum of coefficients for the four quarters was
approximately zero for each of the commodity groups tested. No significant
long-run (i.e. over the first four-quarters) effect could be detected,
although a different lag structure might yield more informative results.
Regression results for commodities overall and for food, as a representative
subgroup, are reproduced in Table 1.
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Despite its logical shortcomings, an estimation similar to Gilbert's
was also attempted, with all variables except debt-servicing entering as first
differences of logs. Not a single coefficient on debt proved significant, and
for each commodity subgroup, the sum of coefficients on the distributed lag
equaled zero. The empirical results for "all commodities" and for food are
shown in Table 2. The same regressions with a slightly different
representation of debt, total debt-service divided by the commodity price
index, yielded equally unfruitful results. Representative regressions for
this specification are displayed in Table 3.
The consistent lack of significance corroborates Gilbert's own
findings in his single-equation estimations. Only in his restricted three-
stage least squares version is the importance of debt apparent. Considering
both Gilbert's results and the results obtained here, the evidence of a debt
effect on commodity prices must still be considered inconclusive for several
reasons: (1) the apparently arbitrary result that debt is important only with
a four-quarter lag; (3) the consistent lack of significance in any of the
single-equation estimates; and (3) the zero long-term effect obtained by
summing the coefficients of the distributed lag. Note that, in contrast, the
effects of industrial production and the real dollar exchange rate were shown
to be robust to these variations in equation specification. It must be
concluded that empirical support of an outward shift in supply is extremely
weak, if not non-existent.
The hypothesized economic relation between debt-servicing needs and
commodity supply depends largely on developing countries' inability to borrow
further in the face of debt-repayment shocks or export price shocks. It might
consequently be expected that the influence of developing country debt will be
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confined to the recent period of widespread liquidity constraints, tighter
bank credit, and frequent rescheduling. Data from the 1970's, when debt and
debt-service increased but LDC borrowers remained essentially solvent, could
obscure effects associated with debt-servicing crisis in the 1980's.
A regression focusing solely or; the 1980-1986 period, however, failed
to produce compelling evidence of the relevance of debt. The regression in
levels again produced significant debt coefficients of varying sign. While
their sum was no longer uniformly zero in each equation, the mixed positive
and negative coefficients, as well as an indication of high negative
autocorrelation, do not constitute strong evidence of an outward shift in
supply. The results for total commodities are presented in Table 4. With
additional observations, and therefore more degrees of freedom, an annual
specification might give more robust results. The effect of debt in
regressions run in first differences for the 1980-86 period was again
insignificant. Results are displayed in Table 5, where debt enters in levels,
and in Table 6, where debt enters as the ratio of debt to commodity prices.
Evidence of a Downward-Sloping Supply Curve
The role debt may play in altering the slope of the supply curve
should be observable empirically through the commodity price response to known
supply and demand shocks. As mentioned earlier, for given quantity shocks to
supply and demand, a downward-sloping supply curve will result in greater
price volatility than would an upward-sloping or vertical supply curve. A
price response exceeding 1% for a 1% change in the real exchange rate, for
example, is highly suggestive of downward-sloping supply; it would be
theoretically inconsistent with an upward-sloping or vertical supply curve.
Since a downward-sloping supply will result in greater price
responsiveness than an upward-sloping curve, commodity price responses to
121
exchange rate and industrial production shocks during different time periods
can be compared as a test of a change in the slope of the supply curve.
Therefore, the sample was divided at 1980, assuming that liquidity constraints
did not play a major role for most developing country exporters prior to this
point.
Regressions on first differences of logq for the 1962-79 period and
the 1980-86 period do not indicate that the slope of the supply curve has
changed from positive in the 1960s and 1970s to negative in this decade.
Comparing the sum of coefficients on four-quarter distributed lags of
industrial production and the exchange rate, it is observed that for no
commodity group index did both the industrial production and the exchange rate
coefficients increase (in magnitude) in the 1980s. For total commodities,
price responsiveness to the exchange rate increased from -0.7 to -1.2, but
responsiveness to industrial production decreased from 2.3 to an- implausible
-0.5. For the commodity subgroups, the sum of coefficients either changed
sign or declined (in magnitude) in the 1980s. Regressions over the 1962-79
period and the 1980-86 period are reproduced in Table 7 for total commodities
and the four commodity subgroups.
It is also noteworthy that both metals and agricultural raw materials
show elasticities of price with respect to the exchange rate that are greater
than one in the 1960s and 1970s, but smaller than one in the 1980s. If
anything, this would imply a downward-sloping supply pre-1980, an upward-
sloping supply today. Although there are no obvious economic explanations for
such supply behavior, there is no evidence here that debt has created a
downward-sloping supply curve of non-fuel primary commodities in the 1980s.
In more restricted regressions measuring only contemporaneous
commodity price responses to industrial production and exchange rate changes,
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similar results held. The "all commodities" regression is shown in Table 8.
Total commodity prices in the 1980s exhibited a stronger response to exchange
rate changes but a lower response to industrial output fluctuations than in
the preceding two decades. Again, no commodity group showed greater
responsiveness to both demand variables in the 1980s than in the 1960s and
1970s. The elasticity of real metal prices to real exchange rate changes
exceeded unity for the 1961-1979 period, again indicating the importance of
factors other than debt.
In sum, the "target revenue" and "wealth effect" descriptions of
debt's impact on commodity prices do not seem to be substantiated
empirically. An outward shift in commodity supply, consistent with an
exogenous increase in the "target revenue," was not detected statistically. A
downward-sloping supply curve, a key implication of both the "target revenue"
and "wealth effect" propositions, was not empirically evident either; if the
supply curve has at any point been downward-sloping, it has not been as a
result of increasing developing country debt.
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III. THE EFFECT OF REAL DEPRECIATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The Supply Response to a Real Depreciation
The role of real depreciations in increasing primary commodity supply
in developing countries could be closely tied to that of debt. Indeed, if
developing country monetary authorities devalue as a consequence of debt-
servicing difficulties, commodity supply should shift outward as the "target
revenue" hypothesis would predict. Similarly, if devaluation occurred in
response to a fall in the price of the main export, there could be an increase
in supply, making it look as though the supply curve was downward-sloping. Of
course, real devaluations could take place for reasons unrelated to debt or
export prices and these will have an impact on export supply.
The rationale for considering real depreciations as a determinant of
commodity supply is clear: following a devaluation, a given (world) dollar
price for a commodity translates into more (real) local currency units and
thus should cause local producers and exporters to expand supply, assuming
some of their costs are incurred in local currency.
This explanation does not require direct government involvement in
the commodity supply process; the incentive extends to private as well as
public enterprises. An internalization of the national welfare was implicit
in previous scenarios where producers responded directly to national debt
problems. This applies automatically to state-owned enterprises or to
industries with close ties to government. For other businesses, supply may
react to policy measures, such as export subsidies or tax incentives, designed
to increase foreign exchange earnings. A real devaluation is an observable
example of such a policy measure.
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For any country-commodity pair, the commodity supply response to real
depreciations can be ascertained by examining export volume as a function of
the dollar commodity price and the real dollar exchange rate in terms of the
local currency. For the moment, the causes of the depreciation--debt, a fall
in export prices, a change in regime--need not be specified. Instead, the
following questions are asked: For any country, does a real depreciation
cause supply to increase? If so, have devaluations in developing countries
depressed commodity prices?
Empirical Results: Metals
A logical point of departure for empirical testing is the metals
subgroup. As non-agricultural commodities, metal supplies are not influenced
by weather; thus, this source of disturbance can be ignored in modeling
supply. Moreover, prices of metals have declined by more than any other
commodity group--42% in real terms since 1980. Finally, many important metal
producers are among the world's largest debtors, such as Chile, Peru, Bolivia
and Brazil.
Econometric testing for the effect of real depreciations on commodity
export supply was relatively straightforward. The first step was to identify
country-commodity pairs, such as Chile and copper or Bolivia and tin, where
the export is important to the country, or the country's market share in the
commodity is high, or both.
In the Chile and copper example, it is expected that the volume of
Chile's copper exports responds positively to both the dollar price of copper
and the real Chilean peso value of the dollar. Two representations of supply
were tested. In the first, Chile's copper exports were expressed as a
function of a distributed lag of the real Chilean peso price of copper--i.e.,
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the dollar price of copper multiplied by the nominal dollar exchange rate
divided by the Chilean price index--and a time trend. In the second version,
distributed lags of the dollar price of copper and the real Chilean exchange
rate entered separately; if producers' costs are not entirely denominated in
local currency terms, a 1% rise in the dollar price of copper and a 1% rise in
the real value of the dollar might affect supply behavior differently.
Estimation required the use of instrumental variables, since Chile's
copper exports in one period could affect both the copper price and Chile's
real exchange rate in the same period. Current and lagged values of OECD
industrial production served as instrumental variables in a two-stage least-
squares regression. Industrial production should clearly be correlated with
the price of copper, but is not influenced by the volume of Chile's copper
exports. Results after the first estimation stage indicated that this
instrumental variable representation of the real exchange rate was acceptable.
The export supply function was estimated for the following country-
commodity pairs: Chile and copper, Zaire and copper, Zambia and copper, Peru
and copper, Peru and lead, Bolivia and tin, Malaysia and tin, Thailand and
tin, Bolivia and zinc, Peru and zinc, Brazil and iron ore, Chile and iron ore,
Peru and iron ore, Liberia and iron ore. The period of estimation, which was
performed on a quarterly basis, covered 1962-85, but was often considerably
shorter because of data limitations.
Unfortunately, coefficients produced by these regressions gave no
indication whatsoever as to how supply responds to price or real exchange rate
changes. Representative regressions are reproduced in Table 9, where the
dollar exchange rate and dollar commodity price enter separately, and in
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Table 10, where the real local currency commodity price is the explanatory
variable. A number of coefficients showed statistical significance, but
again, coefficients on other lags tended to be of the opposite sign, resulting
in no long-run effect. Although the sum of coefficients on the commodity
price, the real exchange rate, or the local currency commodity price, was not
uniformly near zero, there was no tendency for the implied effect on supply to
be positive. Within the limitations of this specification, no supply response
to real exchange rate depreciations can be discerned.
A Re-Examination of the Data
The inconclusive nature of the econometric testing suggests a re-
examination of the data for a possible indication as to why no real exchange
rate effect was detected or what alternative specification might prove more
suitable. For the five metals (copper, lead, tin, zinc and iron) export
volumes by major producers have been graphed on an annual basis and are
reproduced in Figure 1. Graphs of these exporting countries' real exchange
rates versus the US dollar can be found in the Figure 2.
Focusing on the most recent decline in commodity prices, it is
immediately apparent from the graphs that although all the countries
considered (except Bolivia) have experienced real depreciations since 1980, in
only a few cases has export volume increased significantly since then: Chile
and copper, Peru and lead, Peru and zinc, Brazil and iron. The timing of
changes in Peru's lead exports, however, suggest that the real exchange rate
had little effect: exports increased sharply in 1982 as Peru underwent a real
appreciation, but decreased in 1984 and 1985 as the currency greatly
depreciated. Chilean increases in copper exports and Brazilian increases in
iron ore exports can be seen as the result of large-scale increases in
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investments in the lowest-cost producers of these minerals. For all the other
cases, excluding Bolivia, exports decreased or remained unchanged despite
large currency depreciations. Even in the instances where the graphs
indicated a correlation between real depreciation and export expansion,
econometric estimations provide no support of the hypothesized exchange rate
effect.
Similar consideration of two industrial country metal exporters,
Australia and Canada, shows that the real exchange rate has not been the
primary determinant of export volume. Excepting a few isolated years of
slight appreciation, the Australian and Canadian currencies have depreciated
consistently against the US dollar since the mid-1970s. In the same period,
Australia's exports of copper and Canada's exports of zinc have steadily
expanded. Australia's lead, zinc and iron exports and Canada's copper and
,lead exports, however, have essentially fluctuated around a constant volume
with no apparent correlation to the real exchange rate.
In sum, then, we find no evidence, observational or econometric, of a
systematic increase in supply caused by real depreciations in developing
countries.
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IV. OTHER EXPLANATIONS FOR DEPRESSED COMMODITY PRICES
Neither the debt nor real exchange rate theories of supply expansion
appear to explain successfully the recent fall in commodity prices. Empirical
testing provides no evidence of either an outward shift of the supply curve or
a downward-sloping supply curve. Can supply behavior explain the price
decline at all?
The volume of developing country exports of many commodities has
decreased absolutely ince 1980. Among the metals considered, tin, lead and
iron ore exports decreased fronm 980 to 1984, while copper exports acreased
but by much less than industrial production. Among the agricultural raw
materials, rubber exports have increased about 10% since 1980, but timber
exports have declined about 20% (however, log exports have been restricted by
the major South-east Asian producers, who are encouraging domestic
processing). Although the decline in the prices of foodstuffs and certain
other agricultural raw materials such as cotton can be largely explained by
the expansion of supply, it is not so obvious that the supply side has been an
important factor in depressing metals and minerals prices. Production of
metals and minerals largely reflects demand. Capacity, rather than
production, is the important supply-side variable. It is not easy to estimate
recent changes in capacity in these industries. Investments in mining and
subsequent treatment facilities respond with a lag of several years to price
changes. Therefore, a case can be made that prices today are being depressed
by capacity coming on-stream in response to the increcre in metals/minerals
prices in the 1970s.
A decline in both price and quantity, as has been the case in the
metals/minerals market in recent years, suggests an inward shift of demand.
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While OECD industrial production has been stagnant since mid-1985, from the
beginning of 1983 to mid-1985 it was at or above trend growth rates. In past
studies, commodity prices were shown to be highly responsive to fluctuations
in macroeconomic output. Is this historical relationship breaking down?
Technical substitution resulting in more efficient use of raw materials may
have reduced comrmodity demand despite a high level of industrial production.
Another possibility is increased self-reliance in the industrial countries for
their primary material needs; this would cause a decline in imports without
decreasing total commodity consumption. A careful analysis of the demand-side
could ascertain the relevance of these trends.
The behavior of inventories also merits further study. Historically,
a high level of inventories, all else equal, will depress commodity prices.
For some commodities today, however, inventory levels are extremely low. A
one-time de-stocking by consumers would depress prices during the de-stocking
but not appear in trade figures. In that case, prices after the de-stocking
would rise in response to reduced inventory levels and trade flows would
resume as before. Again, global consumption data should reveal to what degree
the behavior of importing countries has affected price. These issues are
being examined in ongoing studies.
The findings presented in this paper suggest that supply changes
alone cannot be responsible for the current slump in non-food primary
commodities. A leftward shift of a vertical demand curve accompanied by
outward shifts in supply, for example, could explain both price and quantity
movements. Some demand shift other than mere fluctuations in industrial
output must be taking place, as the compelling export volume figures
suggest. Whether, in addition, a supply effect has played a role will become
more evident once more is understood about demand.
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Table 1: COMIODITY PRICE DETERMINATION, 1961-1986 (LEVELS)
ESTIMATED EQUATION:
4 4
(real commodity price)t = Co + I rli (industrial production)tl + C2ii=0 i30
(real dollar exchange rate)t_i + I C3i (LDC debt-servicing)t_ i + ct
i1
All variables in logs.
RESULTS:
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 1 Al
FROM 1962: 2 UNTIL 1986:
OBSERVATIONS 96
R**2 .95931332
SSR .13184750
DURBIN-WATSOW 1.60757169
Q(27)
NO.
= 46.0169
LABEL
*s***r
DECREES OF FREEDOM 81
RBAR**2 .95228105
SEE .40345345E-01
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .126697E-01
VAR LAG COEFFICIENT
*** *** 1********* STAND. ERROR* * * *** * T-STATISTIC*>>*22:**>R
1 CONSTANT
2 INDPRO
3 INDPRO
4 INDPRO
5 INDPRO
6 INDPRO
7 RELWHPRI
8 RELWHPRI
9 RELWHPRI
10 RELWHPRI
11 RELWHPRI
12 LD.TDS
13 LDCTDS
14 LDCTDS
15 LDCTDS
16 RHO
0
9
9
9
9
9
7
7
7
7
7
10
10
10
10
1
0 -9.293379
0 1.154284
1 .6431950
2 .2642714
3 .2154325
4 -.1040104
0 -.3530552
1 -.2300821
2 -.5005748
3 .1981074
4 .5099532E-01
1 -.1757373
2 1.568106
3 -2.814825
4 1.449209
0 .9928171
11.31615
.4125741
.4570354
.4644946
.64997093
.4273728
.1702598
.1891359
.1881101
.1959494
.2075670
.5860063
1.103547
1.109647
.6168055
.1225396E-01
-.8212495
2.797763
1.407320
.5689440
.4311157
-.2433717
-2.073626
-1.216491
-2.661074
1.011013
.2456812
-.2998898
1.420969
-2.536686
2.349539
81.02010
132
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 2 FOOD
FROM 1962: 2 UNTIL 1986: 1
OBSERVATIONS 96 DECREES OF
R**2 .94243354 RBAR**2
SSR .28017317 SEE
DURBIN-WATSON 1.85
Q(27) 21.4219
NO. LABEL
I CONSTANT
2 INDPRO
3 INDPRO
4 INDPRO
5 INDPRO
6 INDPRO
7 RELWHPRI
8 RELWHPRI
9 RELWHPRI
10 RELWHPRI
11 RELWHPRI
12 LDCTDS
13 LDCTDS
14 LDCTDS
15 LDCTDS
16 RHO
571731
SIGN
FREEDOM 81
.93248378
.58812651E-01
IFICANCE LEVEL .766141
VAR LAC COEFFICIENT
*** *** ***********
0 0 4.188882
9 0 .7472711
9 1 .4445105
9 2 .6934935
9 3 -.3595467
9 4 -.5220499E-01
7 0 -.1085660
7 1 -.5546901
7 2 -.9532209
7 3 .4559173
7 4 -.3232297
10 1 .4198577
10 2 1.283102
10 3 -3.518994
10 4 1.565058
1 0 .9604809
STAND. ERROR
4.498874
.6063436
.6770116
.6876684
.7398519
.6398787
.2481794
.2728706
.2695785
.2797311
.2701479
.8790213
1.634282
1.641015
.8774926
.3290515E-01
T-STATISTIC
**O* * *
.9310958
1.232422
.6565774
1.008471
-.4859712
-.8158575E-01
-.4374499
-2.032795
-3,535967
1.629841
-1.196492
.4776422
.7851168
-2.144401
1.783557
29.18938
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Table 2: COMMODITY PRICE DETERMINATION, 1961-1986 (FIRST DIFFERENCES)
ESTIMATED EQUATION:
4 4
A (real commodity price)t - Co + i Cli (industrial production)t i +
iSO i04
C2i a (real dollar exchange rate)t_ + I C3i (LDC debt-servicing)t_ i ctis1
All variables in logs.
RESULTS:
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 12 DALLCOM
FROM 1962: 3 UNTIL 1986: 1
OBSERVATIONS 95 DECREES OF
R**2 .45119955 RBAR**2
SSR .13291911 SEE
DURBIN-WATSON 2.00699316
= 37.6091
LABEL
*** **
FREEDOM 80
.35515948
.40761364E-01
SICNIFICANCE LEVEL .842484E-01
VAR LAC COEFFICIENT
*** t*** ***** * ***
STAND. ERROR
************
T-STATISTIC
t**********
1 CONSTANT
2 DINDPRO
3 DINDPRO
4 DINDPORO
5 DINDPRO
6 DINDPRO
7 DRELWHPR
8 DRELWHPR
9 DRELWHPR
10 DRELWHPR
11 DRELWHPR
12 LDCTDS
13 LDCTDS
14 LDCTDS
15 LDCTDS
16 RHO
0
18
18
18
18
18
17
17
17
17
17
10
10
10
10
0 -.6275409E-01
0 .8785019
1 .6953593
2 .2868380
3 .2831614E-01
4 -.9890509E-01
0 -.2691803
1 -.3176076
2 -.5326685
3 .2246847
4 .2108863E-01
1 .6332328
2 -.5050567
3 -.8723145
4 .7469169
0 .2825486
.1152812
.4063814
.4124330
.4201404
.4438446
.4198097
.1723547
.1852606
.1918061
.1953917
.2023746
.5853922
1.431084
1.434968
.6110942
.1129603
-.5443564
2.161767
1.685993
.6827195
.6379742E-01
-.2355950
-1.561781
-1.714383
-2.777120
1.149920
.1042059
1.081724
-.3529190
-.6078982
1.222261
2.501308
Q(27)
NO.
*-**
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE 13 DF
FROM 1962: 3 UNTIL 1986: 1
OBSERVATIONS 95 D
R**2 .34711027 R
SSR .29338602 S
DURBIN-WATSON 2.01092482
Q(27)
NO.
**
= 23.0966
LABEL
,A' 1r-
OOD
ECREES OF
BAR**2
EE
FREEDOM 80
.23285457
.60558444E-01
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .679810
VAR LAG COEFFICIENT
*** *,* t**********
STAND. ERROR
************
T-STATIS'IIC
1 CONSTANT
2 DINDPRO
3 DINDPRO
4 DINDPRO
5 DINDPRO
6 DINDPRO
7 DRELWHPR
8 DRELWHPR
9 DRELWHPR
10 DRELWHPR
11 DRELWHPR
12 LDCTDS
13 LDCTDS
14 LDCTDS
15 LDCTDS
16 RHO
0
18
18
18
18
18
17
17
17
17
17
10
10
10
10
1
O -.7427378E-01
O .6826746
1 .5072761
2 .7338001
3 -.5105018
4 -.3203938E-01
0 .1731943E-01
1 -.6064393
2 -.9309013
3 .5106310
4 -.2980577
1 1.269754
2 -1.592843
3 -.6632798
4 .9902117
0 .1252021
.1477465
.6050211
.6469756
.6591303
.6974727
.6238273
.2579573
.2793970
.2855174
.2933275
.3031253
.8428358
2.156416
2.194060
.9045072
.1144768
-.5027109
1.128348
.7840731
1.113285
-.7319308
-.5135938E-01
.6714068E-01
-2.170529
-3.260401
1.740822
-.9832824
1.506526
-.7386526
-.3023070
1.094753
1.093690
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Table 3: COMMODITY PRICE DETERMINATION, 1961-1986 (FIRST DIFFERENCES)
ESTIMATED EQUATION:
4 4
a (real commodity price) t CO I Cli (industrial production)t_ i
i=0 i=O4
C2i a (real dollar exchange rate)t_ i + I C3i (LDC debt-servicing/real
imI
commodity price)ti + c t
All variables in logs.
RESULTS:
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 12 DAI
FROM 1962: 3 UNTIL 1986: 1
OBSERVATIONS
R**2
SSR .135
DURBIN-WATSON 1.9
Q(27) = 31.6715 
NO. LABEL
LLCOM
95 DECREES OF FREEDOM
.43941759 RBAR**2 .3
77269 SEE .41196
)7438583
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .244467
VAR LAC COEFFICIENT
*** ***t* *** tt** **********
80
4131566
585E-01
STAND. ERROR
* ** ** *****
T-STATISTIC
1 CONSTANT
2 DINDPRO
3 DINDPRO
4 DINDPRO
5 DINDPRO
6 DINDPRO
7 DRELWHPR
8 DRELWHPR
9 DRELWHPR
10 DRELWHPR
11 DRELWHPR
12 LDCTDS
13 LDCTDS
14 LDCTDS
15 LDCTDS
16 RHO
0
18
18
18
18
18
17
17
17
17
17
10
10
10
10
1
0 .2561049E-01
0 1.076154
1 .7880824
2 .3277227
3 -.5086920E-01
4 -.5500125E-01
0 -.2271584
1 -.2543146
2 -.3628154
3 .3044028
4 .1107484
1 .7826118E-01
2 .7237430E-01
3 -.1215991
4 -.3280591E-01
O .3241147
.1137512
,.4154082
.4155434
.4111304
.4320522
.4303122
.1715693
.1761239
.1756524
.1798253
.2275743
.1021197
.9179958E-01
.9215201E-01
.8313073E-01
.1308060
.2251447
2.590595
1.896510
.7971260
-.1177385
-.1278171
-1.324004
-1.443953
-2.065531
1.692770
.4866472
.7663674
.7883946
-1.319549
-.3946303
2.477828
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE 13 DFOOD
FROM 1962: 3 UNTIL 1986: 1
OBSERVATIONS 95 DECREES OF
R**2 .33089366 RBAR**2
SSR .30067320 SEE
DURBIN-WATSON 1.95747502
- 23.1343
LABEL
+***
1 CONSTANT
2 DINDPRO
3 DINDPRO
4 DINDPRO
5 DINDPRO
6 DINDPRO
7 DRELWHPR
8 DRELWHPR
9 DRELWHPR
10 DRELWHPR
11 DRELWHPR
12 LDCTDS
13 LDCTDS
14 LDCTDS
15 LDCTDS
16 RHO
FREEDOM 80
.21380005
.61305913E-01
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .677777
VAR LAC COEFFICIENT
*** *** * ********
0
18
18
18
18
18
17
17
17
17
17
10
10
10
10
1
0 .1001993
0 1.220214
1 .7687706
2 .7993233
3 -.4664752
4 -.3236738
0 .4663141E-01
1 -.4659206
2 -.6394327
3 .6038866
4 .1145388
1 .1297588
2 .5657782E-01
3 -.7907238E-01
4 -.1163834
0 .3495992
STAND. ERROR
.1618845
.6035268
.6189306
.6085187
.6337667
.6485153
.2585423
.2634143
.2619168
.267019A
.3377918
.7859548E-01
.5169720E-01
.5488803E-01
.6261116E-01
.1398122
T-STATISTIC
.6189552
2.021807
1.242095
1.313556
-.7360361
-.4990997
.1803628
-1.768775
-2.4 .1358
2.261586
.3390811
1.650970
1.094408
-1.440613
-1.858828
2.500491
Q(27)
NO.
***
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Table 4: COMMODITY PRICE DETERMINATION, 1980-1986 (LEVELS)
ESTIMATED EQUATION:
4 4
(real commodity price)t = C + I Cli (industrial production)t_ i + I C2i
i=O4 i=O
(real dollar exchange rate)t_ i + I C3i (LDC debt-servicing)t i *+ Cizl
All variables in logs.
RESULTS:
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 1 ALLCOM
FROM 1980: 2 UNTIL 1986: 1
OBSERVATIONS 24 DECREES OF
R**2 .98772180 RBAR**2
SSR .50115135E-02 SEE
DURBIN-WATSON 2.60388488
Q(12) = 26.7206
NO. LABEL
s,** *****
FREEDOM 9
.96862239
.23597348E-01
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .847507E-02
VAR LAG
*** ***
COEFFICIENT
***********
STAND. ERROR
*****- i*****
T-STATISTIC
***>k100040
1 CONSTINT
2 INDPRO
3 INDPRO
4 INDPRO
5 INDPRO
6 INDPRO
7 RELWHPRI
8 RELWHPRI
9 RELWHPRI
10 RELWHPRI
11 RELWHPRI
12 LDCTDS
13 LDCTDS
14 LDCTDS
15 LDCTDS
16 RHO
0
9
9
9
9
9
7
7
7
7
7
10
10
10
10
1
0 3.854150
0 3.267295
1 -2.391925
2 1.867177
3 -1.195091
4 2.113220
0 -.6569767
1 .4972952
2 .9289634E-01
3 .3524988E-01
4 .5708427
1 -2.655128
2 3.580055
3 -4.950950
4 2.614469
0 -.7845407
1.897231
.4880019
1.048822
1.157208
1.081859
.7049501
.1829424
.41 37690
.4662657
.4226004
.1997258
.9751747
1.726840
1.621617
.7516245
.2819872
2.031461
6.695249
-2.280582
1.613519
-1.104665
2.997688
-3.591166
1,201867
.1992348
.8341186E-01
2.858132
-2.722720
2.073183
-3.053096
3.478425
-2.782186
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Table 5: COMMODITY PRICE DETERMINATION, 1980-1986 (FIRST DIFFERENCES)
ESTIMATED EQUATION:
4 4
A (real commodity price)t
= Co0 + I Cli A (industrial production)t_ 1 + i0 i=0
4
C2 £ A (real dollar exchange rate)t_ i + I C3 i (LDC debt servicing)t-i + Ei=l-
All variabics in logs.
RESULTS:
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 12 DALLCOM
FROM 1980: 2 UNTIL 1986: 1
OBSERVATIONS 24 DECREES
R**2 .83145255 RBAR**2
SSR .71988479E-02 SEE
DURBIN-WATSON 2.16946160
Q(12)
NO.
.':
= 10.4059
LABEL
**k**
OF FREEDOM 9
.56926762
.28282008E-01
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .580396
VAR LAG
*** ***
COEFFICIENT
**********4
STAND. ERROR
* -********
T-STATISTIC
**^ * ***** **
1 CONSTANT
2 DINDPRO
3 DINDPRO
4 DINDPRO
5 DINDPRO
6 DINDPRO
7 DRELWHPR
8 DRELWHPR
9 DRELWHPR
10 DRELWHPR
11 DRELWHPR
12 LDCTDS
13 LDCTDS
14 LDCTDS
15 LDCTDS
16 RHO
0
18
18
18
18
18
17
17
17
17
17
10
10
10
10
1
0 -1.465430
0 -.2967S97
1 -.4856700
2 .1231908
3 .2069536
4 -.6651510
0 -.3905635
1 -.3434161
2 -.1321617
3 .2194131
4 -.3692215
1 .2107351
2 -1.265760
3 .4628202
4 .6833252
0 -.1733076
.7801017
.7581996
.7026720
.7228133
.7237842
.7587601
.2204903
.2392397
.2154182
.2260667
.2614172
.9193036
2.124332
2.069319
.8501860
.3285007
-1.878512
-.3913609
-.6911759
.1704324
.2859327
-.8766289
-1.771341
-1.435448
-.6135122
.9705678
-1.412384
.2292334
-.5958387
.2236583
.8037361
-.525716
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Table 6: COMMODITY PRICE DETERMINATION, 1980-86 (FIRST DIFFERENCES)
ESTIMATED EQUATION:
4 4
6 (real commodity price)t = Co + I Cli a (industrial production)t i + I
i=O i=O
c2i A (real dollar exchange rate)t. i + 1 C3i (LDC debt-servicing/reali=l
commodity price)t_i + Et
All variables in logs.
RESULTS:
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 12
FROM 1980: 2 UNTIL 1986:
OBSERVATIONS 24
R**2 .83223498
SSR .71654294E-02
DURBIN-WATSON 2.00977762
Q(12)
NO.
+**
= .11.6298
LABEL
* ** *
DALLCOM
1
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 9
RBAR**2 .57126717
SEE .28216286E-01
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .475846
VAR LAG COEFFICIENT
*** *** ****** ****
STAND. ERROR
************f
T-STATISTIC
* *** * ** *
1 CONSTANT
2 DINDPRO
3 DINDPRO
4 DINDPRO
5 DINDPRO
6 DINDPRO
7 DRELWHPR
8 DRELWHPR
9 DRELWHPR
10 DRELWHPR
11 DRELWHPR
12 LDCTDS
13 LDCTDS
14 LDCTDS
15 LDCTDS
16 RHO
0
18
18
18
18
18
17
17
17
17
107
10
10
10
10
1
0 -.8196843
0 -.4430692
1 .9261485E-01
2 .6991725
3 -.6143730E-01
4 .6346466
0 -.2878742
1 -.2649292E-02
2 -.1858741
3 .1948915
4 -.7443395
1 -.7839444
2 .6993982
3 -.2864712
4 .4224543
0 -. 6063838
.7329794
.7824914
.7298450
.8417937
.9200311
.7995285
.2761710
.3174618
.2921486
.2648321
.3430225
.1892672
.3175551
.3584665
.1813196
.3519220
-1.118291
-.5662288
.1268966
.8305746
-.6677742E-01
.7937762
-1.042377
-.8345231E-02
-.6362313
.7359058
-2.169944
-4.141998
2.202447
-.7991575
2.329888
-1.723063
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Table 7: TEST OF INCREASED PRICE SENSITIVITY 1962-79 VS. 1980-86
ESTIMATED EQUATION:
4 4
a (real commodity price)t = CO + I Cli A (industrial production)t + 
i=O i=O
C2i (real dollar exchange rate)t_l + et
All variables in logs.
RESULTS:
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 12
FROM 1962: 3 UNTIL 1979:
OBSERVATIONS 70
R**2 .45587102
DALLCOM
4
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 59
RBAR**2 .36364577
SSR .10326531 SEE .4183610,
DURBIN-WATSON 2.02778254
Q(24) = 26.2360 SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .341302
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT
1 CONSTANT 0 0 -.3101250E-01
2 DINDPRO
3 DINDPRO
4 DINDPRO
5 DINDPRO
6 DINDPRO
7 DRELWHPR
8 DRELWHPR
9 DRELWHPR
10 DRELWHPR
11 DRELWHPR
12 RHO
18
18
18
18
18
17
17
17
17
17
1
0 1.123859
1 1.100987
2 .1051100
3 -.4503316E-02
4 .4299605
0 -.3406263
1 -.2522172
2 -.5893370
3 .3586969
4 .1024357
0 .1894138
4E-01
STAND. ERROR
.9561789E-02
.4835625
.5332210
.5321646
.5728182
.5151164
.2889649
.2868084
.2839860
.2809951
.2830361
.1324036
T-STATISTIC
-3.243378
2.324124
2.064786
.1975160
-.7861685E-02
.8346862
-1.178781
-.8793926
-2.075233
1.276524
.3619176
1.430570
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE 12 DA
FROM 1980: 2 UNTIL 1986: 1
OBSERVATIONS 24 D
R**2 .60942161 R
SSR .16682035E-01
DURBIN-WATSON 1.83847514
Q(12)
NO.
= 7.43353
LABEL
*****r
1 CONSTANT
2 DINDPRO
3 DINDPRO
4 DINDPRO
5 DINDPRO
6 DINDPRO
7 DRELWHPR
8 DRELWHPR
9 DRELWHPR
10 DRELWHPR
11 DRELWHPR
12 RHO
S
LLCOM
ECREES OF F
BAR**2
EE
REEDOM 13
.30897669
.35822248E-01
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .827686
VAR LAC COEFFICIENT
0 0 -.3426077E-02
18 0 .2483674
18 1 .3254538E-01
18 2 .3620647
18 3 .1266255
18 4 -1.271712
17 0 -.3951537
17 1 -.3547413
17 2 -.2001167
17 3 .1001896
17 4 -.2565133
1 0 .3664260
STAND. ERROR
.1573371E-01
.8350183
.7069625
.6714029
.7168713
.7339673
.2152956
.2337927
.2109080
.2271964
.2797824
.3137115
T-STATISTIC
-.2177539
.2974395
.4603551E-O1
.5392659
.1766362
-1.732655
-1.835400
-1.517333
-.9488340
.4409824
-.9168313
1.168035
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 13
FROM 1962: 2 UNTIL 1979:
OBSERVATIONS 70
R**2
DFOOD
4
DEGREES OF FREEDOM
.36620491 RBAR**2
SSR .22830023
DURBIN-WATSON 1.98652791
SEE
59
.25878201
.62205268E-01
Q(24) = 14.1916 SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .942205
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT
*** ***** *** *** **********
STAND. ERROR
* ** * -*****
T-STATISTIC
1 CONSTANT
2 DINDPRO
3 DINDPRO
4 DINDPRO
5 DINDPRO
6 DINDPRO
7 DRELWHPR
8 DRELWHPR
9 DRELWHPR
10 DRELWHPR
11 DRELWHPR
12 RHO
0
18
18
18
18
18
17
17
17
17
17
1
0 -.3598761E-01
0 .8155914
1 1.262242
2 .7043205
3 -.9900458
4 .9469092
0 -.1947096
1 -.4518670
2 -1.126889
3 .7632708
4 -.5771619
0 -.4475087E-01
.1145166E-01
.7240183
.8853573
.8818169
.9326902
.7655534
.4519457
.4320565
.4309982
.4346250
.4191549
.1438252
-3.142568
1.126479
1.425686
.7987151
-1.061495
1.2368''5
-.4308251
-1.045852
-2.614602
1.756160
-1.376966
-.3111476
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE 13
FROM 1962: 3 UNTIL 1979:
OBSERVATIONS 70
R**2 .36620491
SSR .22830023
DURBIN-WATSON 1.98652791
= 14.1916
LABEL
Q(24)
NO.
t CONSTANT
2 DINDPRO
3 DINDPRO
4 DINDPRO
5 DINDPRO
6 DINDPRO
7 DRELWHPR
8 DRELWHPR
9 DRELWHPR
10 DRELWHPR
11 DRELWHPR
12 RHO
DFOOD
DECRES% OP FREEDOM 59
RBARAvZ .25878201
SEE .62205268E-01
SIGNIFICANCE LEtML .942205
VAR LAG COW0PICIENT
*** *** v0e -g*!****
0
18
18
18
18
18
17
17
17
17
17
1
0 -'.598761E-01
0 .015914
1 1,~62242
2 .1043205
3 -.9900458
4 , 9469092
0 .4947096
1 -. 518670
2 -1',26889
3 , 1632708
4 -0,7)1619
0 ,A44)5087E-01
STAND. ERROR
**** * ******
.1145166E-01
.7240183
.8853573
.8818169
.9326902
.7655534
.4519457
.4320565
.4309982
.4346250
.4191549
.1438252
T-STATISTIC
-3.142568
1.126479
1.425686
.7987151
-1.061495
1.236895
-.4308251
-1.045852
-2.614602
1.756160
-1.376966
-.3111476
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 13
FROM 1980: 2 UNTIL 1986:
OBSERVATIONS 24
R**2 .47122442
SSR .41098932E-01
DURBIN-WATSON 1.75180216
Q(12)
NO.
***t
= 10.0393
LABEL
*****
DFOOD
1
DEGRM5 Of FREEDOM
RBAR*'k
SEE
13
.06447398
.56226829E-01
SICNIFICANCE V6L .612513
VAR LAG C0OFFICIENT
*** *** 4.S*; * ,r ***
STAND. ERROR
04*4s {-* i***
T-STATISTIC
* **. -****
1 CONSTANT 0 0 ,9908408E-03
2 DINDPRO 18 0 ,3129710
3 DINDPRO 18 1 -,9972799
4 DINDPRO 18 2 ,6b32021
5 DINDPRO 18 3 -,3419191E-01
6 DINDPRO 18 4 -,174655
7 DRELWHPR 17 0 -,223502
8 DRELWHPR 17 1 -,4618817
9 DRELWHPR 17 2 -,3828627
10 DRELWHPR 17 3 .2606547
11 DRELWHPR 17 4 -.3673358
12 RHO 1 0 .2780440
.2211476E-01
1.470488
1.145070
1.073120
1.156284
1.178160
.3516611
.3695523
.3360021
.3560188
.4333583
.3555300
.4480450E-01
.2536376
-.8709332
.5993758
-.2957052E-01
-.9970249
-.6322854
-1.249841
-1.139465
.7321376
-.8476491
.7820548
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE 14 DB
FROM 1962: 3 UNTIL 1979: 4
OBSERVATIONS 70 DI
R**2 .31291104 RI
SSR .41533045 SI
DURBIN-WATSON 1.94394464
Q(24)
NO.
***t
= 15.3300
LABEL
*****J
EV
ECREES OF
BAR**2
EE
FREEDOM 59
.19645528
.83901723E-01
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .910730
VAR LAC COEFFICIENT
*** *** **********
STAND. ERROR
*********** *~r~ a~
T-STATISTIC
*** t* *
1 CONSTANT
2 DINDPRO
3 DINDPRO
4 DINDPRO
5 DINDPRO
6 DINDPRO
7 DRELWHPR
8 DRELWHPR
9 DRELWHPR
10 DRELWHPR
11 DRELWHPR
12 RHO
0
18
18
18
18
18
17
17
17
17
17
1
0 -.2297853E-01
0 1.856946
1 1.729687
2 -.8978575
3 -.3662724
4 1.423505
0 -.1811430
1 .9421854
2 .4745760
3 .3053723
4 1.218536
0 .3501587
.2305752E-01
.9679082
1.007720
1.007480
1.088277
1.033690
.5647688
.5855718
.5830059
.5676482
.5708004
.1228109
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 14
FROM 1980: 2 UNTIL 1986:
OBSERVATIONS 24
R**2 .61859483
SSR .78789190E-01
DURBIN-WATSON 1.91707471
Q(12)
NO.
***4·
= 14.8011
LABEL
*****P
DBEV
1
DECREES OF FREEDOM
RBAR**2
SEE
13
.32520624
.77850542E-01
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .252492
VAR LAC COEFFICIENT
*** *** ***********
STAND. ERROR
* ** * * ** * *
T-STATISTIC
** ** * ** t  *
1 CONSTANT 0 0
2 DINDPRO
3 DINDPRO
4 DINDPRO
5 DINDPRO
6 DINDPRO
7 DRELWHPR
8 DRELWHPR
9 DRELWHPR
10 DRELWHPR
11 DRELWHPR
12 RHO
18
18
18
18
18
17
17
17
17
17
1
.4296077E-01
0 -.6312947
1 3.708291
2 -.4231533
3 .3000533
4 -.8600308
0 -.6500567
1 -.6968419
2 -.3229019
3 -.6525578
4 -.9607469
0 .6191590
.4835425E-01
1.568351
1.479658
1.434077
1.491987
1.593471
.4616963
.4837173
.4425506
.4846034
.5764725
.2103984
-.9965743
1.918514
1.716435
-.8911910
-.3365618
1.377111
-.3207384
1.609001
.8140157
.5379605
2.134785
2.851202
.8884590
-.4025214
2.506182
-.2950701
.2011098
-.5397216
-1.407975
-1.440597
-.7296383
-1.346581
-1.666596
2.942794
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE 15 DAi
FROM 1962: 3 UNTIL 1979: 4
OBSERVATIONS 70 D
R**2 .42752305 RI
SSR .14155143 SI
DURBIN-WATSON 1.85462478
Q(24)
NO.
,f,*-
= 24.7616
LABEL
*****~rk
CRAW
ECREES OF
BAR**2
EE
FREEDOM 59
.33049306
.48981392E-01
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .418809
VAR LAG COEFFICIENT
*** *** ***********
STAND. ERROR
************
T-STATISTIC
******'^ ***
1 CONSTANT
2 DINDPRO
3 DINDPRO
4 DINDPRO
5 DINDPRO
6 DINDPRO
7 DRELWHPR
8 DRELWHPR
9 DRELWHPR
10 DRELWHPR
11 DRELWHPR
12 RHO
0
18
18
18
18
18
17
17
17
17
17
1
0 -.1719784E-01
0 .8170342
1 .9143522
2 -.4218884
3 1.009891
4 -.9712574
0 -.4470408
1 -.7628320
2 -.1530044
3 -.2818286
4 .1861381
o .3556280
.1366468E-01
.5919586
.5872925
.5871976
.6345794
.6036251
.3329430
.3418753
.3408444
.3320382
.3340846
.1294399
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 15
FROM 1980: 2 UNTIL 1986:
OBSERVATIONS 24
R**2 .80288158
SSR .74708542E-02
DURBIN-WATSON 2.36924974
Q(12)
NO.
***4
= 11.2227
LABEL
*tl**
DACRAW
1
DEGREES OF FREEDOM
RBAR**2
SEE
13
.65125203
.23972507E-01
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .509932
VAR LAG COEFFICIENT
*** *** **********
1 CONSTANT 0 0 -.1328903E-01
2 DINDPRO
3 DINDPRO
4 DINDPRO
5 DINDPRO
6 DINDPRO
7 DRELWHPR
8 DRELWHPR
9 DRELWHPR
10 DRELWHPR
11 DRELWHPR
12 RHO
18
18
18
18
18
17
17
17
17
17
1
0 -.8467793
1 .69949059
2 .2393439
3 .7869888
4 -1.353815
0 -.5604983
1 -.7433704E-01
2 -.2035281
3 .2018885
4 .8605593E-01
0 .7104503
STAND. ERROR
.1809043E-01
.5437193
.4704923
.4717281
.4602804
.5050376
.1458401
.1508145
.1352285
.1479300
.1706930
.2428170
T-STATISTIC
-.7345890
-1.557383
1.486541
.5073769
1.709803
-2.680622
-3.843238
-.4929037
-1.505068
1.364757
.5041563
2.925867
-1.258562
1.380222
1.556894
-.7184778
1.591433
-1.609041
-1.342695
-2.231317
-.4488981
-.8487835
.5571584
2.747438
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE 16 DM
FROM 1962: 3 UNTIL 1979: 4
OBSERVATIONS 70 DI
R**2 .34004444 RI
SSR .21440719 Si
DURBIN-WATSON 1.94230359
Q(24)
NO.
***~
= 25.2294
LABEL
*****~
ETALS
EGREES OF
BAR**2
EE
FREEDOM 59
.22818756'
.60282835E-01
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .393384
VAR LAC COEFFICIENT
*** *** **********
STAND. ERROR
Z*~*******
T-STATISTIC
**** ** >***
1 CONSTANT
2 DINDPRO
3 DINDPRO
4 DINDPRO
5 DINDPRO
6 DINDPRO
7 DRELWHPR
8 DRELWHPR
9 DRELWHPR
10 DRELWHPR
11 DRELWHPR
12 RHO
0
18
18
18
18
18
17
17
17
17
17
1
0 -.3160503E-01
0 1.046336
1 .4392807
2 -.1494579
3 .4446174
4 .5771435
0 -1.412830
1 -.2007391
2 -.4609471
3 -.2191120
4 .3961927
0 .1952906
.1387773E-01
.6958267
.7651901
.7646960
.8201519
.742624
.4078898
.4124781
.4091905
.4048948
.4072983
.1317764
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 16
FROM 1980: 2 UNTIL 1986:
OBSERVATIONS 24
R**2 .45429365
SSR .29654587E-01
DURBIN-WATSON 1.62145865
Q(12)
NO.
4**
= 6.14498
LABEL
@^ v;***
1 CONSTANT
2 DINDPRO
3 DINDPRO
4 DINDPRO
5 DINDPRO
6 DINDPRO
7 DRELWHPR
8 DRELWHPR
9 DRELWHPR
10 DRELWHPR
11 DRELWHPR
12 RiO
DMETALS
1
DEGREES OF FREEDOM
RBAR**2
SEE
13
.03451953
.47761094E-01
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .908598
VAR LAC COEFFICIENT
*** *** *@* ******
0
18
18
18
18
178
17
17
17
17
17
1
0 -.3156336E-01
0 1.905290
1 -.8964305
2 .5061491
3 -.5447492
4 -.5504823
0 -.3486466
1 -.8149019E-01
2 .3795850
3 .4842153E-01
4 -.2415673E-01
0 -.1522549
STAND. ERROR
**** *** * *
.1379204E-01
.9804813
1.130175
1.089867
1.136182
.9660024
.2812669
.3702615
.3311930
.3332857
.3909154
.2674140
T-STATISTIC
-2.288520
1.943220
-.7931785
.4644136
-.4794560
-.5698560
-1.239558
-.2200882
1.146114
.1452854
-.6179529E-01
-.5693601
-2.277392
1.503731
.5740805
-.1954474
.5421159
.7774418
-3.463755
-.4866662
-1.126485
-.5411579
.9727335
1.481985
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Table 8: TEST OF INCREASED PRICE SENSITIVITY, 1962-79 VS 1980-86
ESTIMATED EQUATION:
6(real commodity price)t
= C + C1 6(industrial production)t +
C2 A (real dollar exchange rate) + ct
All variables in logs.
RESULTS:
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 12 DALLCOM
FROM 1962: 3 UNTIL 1979: 4
OBSERVATIONS 70 DEGREES OF FREEDOM
R**2 .28328685 RBAR**2 .261
SSR .13601850 SEE .4505693
DURBIN-WATSON 1.99602256
Q(24) = 29.9752 SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .185575
NO. LABEL VAR LAC COEFFICIENT
***f ***** *** * ** ,****:*****
67
89243
OE-01
STAND. ERROR
t**t *******
1 CONSTANT
2 DINDPRO
3 DRELWHPR
4 RHO
0
18
17
1
0 -.1592598E-01
0 1.624368
0 -.9219415E-01
0 .2380721
.8736695E-02
.4420072
.2785534
.1233102
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 12 DALLCOM
FROM 1980: 2 UNTIL 1986: 1
OBSERVATIONS 24 DECREES OF FREEDOM
R**2 .38181446 RBAR**2 .322
SSR .26403387E-01 SEE .3545848
DURBIN-WATSON 1.81759245
Q(12) = 14.5633 SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .266189
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFiCIENT
*** **** *** *** ***C-)***.
21
93964
5E-01
STAND. ERROR
** ** *** **
1 CONSTANT
2 DINDPRO
3 DRELWHPR
4 RHO
0
18
17
I
0 -.1741355E-01
0 .7712587
0 -.4448739
0 .3053370
.1098917E-01
.7162396
.1881330
.2563280
T-STATISTIC
... D.***** O 
-1.822884
3.674980
-.3309748
1.930677
T-STATISTIC
*** k **** 4 
-1.584610
1.076817
-2.364678
1.191196
-- 
---
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Table 9: EXPORT SUPPLY DETERMINATION FOR METALS
(SUPPLY F(DOLLAR COMMODITY PRICE, REAL DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE)}
ESTIMATED EQUATION:
4
(volume of country X's export of commodity Y)t = C0 + [ Cli (dollar price of
4 i 
commodity Y)t-i + [ C2 i (real exchange rate of currency X)t i + C3 (time) + Ct
i=0
Two-stage least-squares estimation used because of simultaneity of commodity price
at t and real exchange rate at t. Instruments consisted of all other right-hand
side variables as well as industrial production from t-3 to t, inclusive.
All variables in logs.
RESULTS (from second stage):
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 2
FROM 1976: 4 UNTIL 1985:
OBSERVATIONS 37
COPCHIL
4
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 27
R**2 .39634138 RBAR**2 . -.86
SSR 8.9722172 SEE .5764584
DURBIN-WATSON 1.84245968
Q(18) 19.9353 SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .336472
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT
*** ***** *F** *** ***********
178851
5
STAND. ERROR
++4f******t*
T-STATISTIC
* ** *****
1 CONSTANT
2 COPPER
3 COPPER
4 COPPER
5 COPPER
6 REACHIL
7 REALCHIL
8 REALCHIL
9 REALCHIL
10 TIME
0
31
31
31
31
25
25
25
25
40
0 24.38270
0 -.6902514
1 -1.755693
2 2.929006
3 -4.929020
0 -10.60634
1 13.63252
2 -6.564132
3 2.843653
0 -.4551187E-01
9.918116
2.980481
2.602304
1.683682
1.860294
5.542709
6.726929
4.299423
3.292628
.2550348E-01
2.458401
-.2315906
-.6746688
1.739643
-2.649591
-1.913567
2.026559
-1.526747
.8636423
-1.784535
I
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE 11 LEADPERU
FROM 1960: 2 UNTIL 1985: 4
OBSERVATIONS 101 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 91
R**2 .90198267 RBAR**2 -1.09009085
SSR 6.3113993 SEE .26335534
DURBIN-WATSON 2.10532559
Q(30) 30.7146 SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .429534
NO. LABEL VAR LAC COEFFICIENT
*** ***** *** *** ***********
STAND. ERROR
* **** ** *,*
T-STATISTIC
****~3** s
1 CONSTANT
2 LEAD
3 LEAD
4 LEAD
5 LEAD
6 REALPERU
7 REALPERU
8 REALPERU
9 REALPERU
10 TIME
0
33
33
33
33
26
26
26
26
40
0 5.531975
0 1.926787
1 -2.439953
2 .7067839
3 -.2607996
0 -1.277748
1 1.503582
2 -1.270390
3 .8201315
0 .2033342E-02
2.037313
1.405252
1.686389
.5730028
.2969827
2.523943
2.765724
1.379213
.8276998
.1284541E-02
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 18
FROM 1975: 4 UNTIL 1985:
OBSERVATIONS 41
R**2 .24887263
SSR 1.0101004
DURBIN-WATSON 1,64370282
Q(18)
NO.
*~
w 11.9222
LABEL
***~h
IRONBRAZ
4
DEGREES OF FREEDOM
RBAR**2
SEE
31
.03080339
.18051007
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .851227
VAR LAC COEFFICIENT
*** ** ******** **
STAND. ERROR
*** * ** ** ** 
T-STATISTIC
***********tOO~
0 0 3.185461
32 0 -2.062088
32 1 1.642821
32 2 .2094081
32 3 -.3899765
24 0 .1338255
24 1 -1.035088
24 2 1.257143
24 3 -.2741275
40 0 .1919513E-02
1.363336
2.209847
1.397179
.8698490
.7801880
1.005479
1.495013
1.169102
.6930964
2.336519
-.9331361
1.175813
.2407407
-.4998495
.1330962
-.6923600
1.075306
-.3955113
.2044960E-01 .9386552E-01
2.715329
1.371133
-1.446850
1.233474
-.8781643
-.5062505
.5436486
-.9210978
.9908563
1.582933
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
CONSTANT
IRON
IRON
IRON
IRON
REALBRAZ
REALBRAZ
REALBRAZ
REALBRAZ
TIME
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Table 10: EXPORT SUPPLY DETERMINATION FOR METALS
[SUPPLY = F(LOCAL CURRENCY PRICE FOR COMMODITIES)J
ESTIMATED EQUATION:
4
(volume of country X's export of commodity Y)t = C0 + i Cli (real price ofi O
commodity Y in terms of currency X)t_ i + C2 (time) t t
Two-stage least-squares estimation used because of simultaneity of commodity price
at t. Instruments consisted of all other right-hand side variables as well as
industrial production from t-3 to t, inclusive.
All variables in logs.
RESULTS (from second stage):
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 2 COPCHIL
FROM 1976: 4 UNTIL 1985: 4
OBSERVATIONS 37 DECREES OF FREEDOM
R**2 -.12105940 RBAR**2 -.301;
SSR 7.2033878 SEE .48204491
DURBIN-WATSON 1.86612427
Q(18) = 13.5523 SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .757778
NO. LABEL VAR LAC COEFFICIENT
*** *r*** ** R** **********
31
37543
S
STAND. ERROR
trt**********
T-STATISTIC
**** *-*****
1 CONSTANT
2 PCOPCHIL
3 PCOPCHIL
4 PCOPCHIL
5 PCOPCHIL
6 TIME
0 0 13.66624
43 0 -2.583925
43 1 2.248946
43 2 1.564389
43 3 -2.472860
42 0 .3626987E-02
5.491364
2.167292
2.357380
1.078333
.8979449
.8336469E-02
2.488679
-1.192237
.9540022
1.450747
-2.753911
.4350748
- ---
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE 11 LEADPERU
FROM 1960: 4 UNTIL 1985: 4
OBSERVATIONS 101 DECREES OF FREEDOM
R**2 -11900068 RBAR**2 -.1771
SSR 3.7132095 SEE .1977028'
DURBIN-WATSON 1.98898725
Q(30) 24.8814 SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .730776
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT
*** ***** *** *** ******L***
95
B9545
5
STAND. ERROR
** ***** ****
T-STATISTIC
** *********
1 CONSTANT
2 PLEDPERU
3 PLEDPERU
4 PLEDPERU
5 PLEDPERU
6 TIME
0
47
47
47
47
42
0 4.653896
0 .9252640
1 -1.181971
2 .3157920
3 -.9945766E-01
0 .1999126E-02
.3078893
.4524773
.5764029
.2979189
.1708482
.6822961E-03
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 18 IRONBRAZ
FROM 1975: 4 UNTIL 1985: 4
OBSERVATIONS 41 DECREES OF FREEDOM
R**2 .34072400 RBAR**2 .2465i
SSR .88658059 SEE .15915676
DURBIN-WATSON 1.65158462
Q(18) 13.1739 SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .781143
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT
*** ***** *** *** ***********
35
4172
iTAND. ERROR
** *** * * *** *
T-STATISTIC
*I**** * **
1 CONSTANT
2 PIRNBRAZ
3 PIRNBRAZ
4 PIRNBRAZ
5 PIRNBRAZ
6 TIME
0
51
51
51
51
42
0 4.015300
0 -1.036049
1 .6901192
2 .6075094
3 -.3889755
0 .1140765E-01
.8275370
.7883604
.7118354
.4312757
.3590993
.2671024E-02
15.11549
2.044885
-2.050599
1.059993
-.5821406
2.929998
4.852109
-1.314170
.9694927
1.408633
-1.083198
4.270889
151
Figure 1: SELECTED COUN'TRY EXPORT VOLUMES, 1960-85
AUSTRALIA'S EXPORTS OF COPPER, 1961-85 AUSTRALIA'S EXPORTS OF IRON, 1971-85
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Figure 1: SELECTED COUNTRY EXPORT VOLUMES, 1960-85 (CONTD)
CANADA'S EXPOf,TS OF COPPER, 1961-.5
CANADA'S EXPORTS OF LEAD, 1967-85
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Figure 1: SELECTED COUNTRY EXPORT VOLUMES, 1960-85 (CONTD)
LIBERIA'S EXPORTS OF IRON, 1964-85
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Figure 1: SELECTED COUNTRY EXPORT VOLUMES, 1960-85 (CONTD)
THAILAND'S EXPORTS OF TIN. 1960-85 ZAIRE'S EXPORTS OF COPPER, 1962-85
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Figure 2: REAL EXCHANGE RATES FOR SELECTED COUNFTRIES, 1960-85 /A
AUSTRAUA'S REAL EXCHANGE RATE. 1960-85
BRAZL'S REAL EXCHANGE RATE. 1960-85
CHILES REAL EXCHANGE RATE. 1960-85
in
:so
Ilatoo
'0100?'gO
170
4,0
JO
,'1:0rio
10
00
BOUVIA'S REAL EXCHANGE RATE. 1960-84
CANADA'S REAL EXCHANGE RATE. 1960-85
UBERIA'S REAL EXCHANGE RATE. 1965-85
" s 7 " as 70 71 73 73 74 t 76 77 78 1 60 t U " S. I
100
&,
l0
71
so
130
, ,
oe
70ai
0 I, 6 U U , 66U 7 t e0 71 7 7 73 7 7 7 7 7 71 H I a,2 i 6. "
I
I
156
Figure 2: REAL EXCHANGE RATES FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1960-85 (CONTD)/A
MALAYSIA'S REAL EXCHANGE RATE. 1960-85
(I40-teo)
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/A The real exchange rate denotes the currency's value in terms of US dollars, adjusted i
for inflation. Thus a rise in the exchange rate implies an appreciation against the
dollar.
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DATA SOURCES
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various
issues:
Commodity Export Volumes (lines 7 2c, 7 2g, 72q, 72t, 72v)
Commodity Price Indices (lines 76ax, 76ex, 76dw, 76bx, 76ay)
Industrial Good Prices (line 63a)
Industrial Production (line 66.b)
Real Dollar Exchange Rate (represented by US relative wholesale
prices, line 63ey 110) (rise in exchange rate denotes dollar
appreciation)
Real Exchange Rate of commodity exporters (represented by the
nominal exchange rate in local currency units per US dollar,
line rf, multiplied by US consumer prices, line 64, divided by
local consumer prices, line 64) (rise in exchange rate denotes
depreciation against dollar)
World Bank, EPDCS
Commodity Export Volume
Commodity Prices (individual commodities)
World Bank, EPDED
World Debt and Debt-Servicing
